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Abstract
Over the past 30 years, the Chinese economy has been going through complex
transformation from a centrally planned towards a market economy. The reform of the
enterprises has played an important part in this transformation. This is in addition to
macro economy reforms, as well as changes in the institutional framework.
The thesis examines the implications of macroeconomic, ownership structure,
as well as comprehensive institutional framework changes for Chinese enterprises’
survival and R&D activities.
I study the impact of both microeconomic factors and the macro economy on
the financial distress1 of Chinese listed companies over a period of massive economic
transition, 1995 to 2006. Using hazard regression analysis, I find substantial effect of
firm level covariates (age, size, cash flow and gearing) on financial distress, but also
significant roles for macroeconomic stability and institution effect. Business exits in
my data on Chinese quoted firms are vanishingly rare, arguably because of active state
protection for the failing firms.
1 Following Chan and Chen (1991), financially distressed firms “have lost market value because of
poor performance, they are inefficient producers, and they are likely to have high financial leverage and
cash flow problems. They are marginal in the sense that their prices tend to be more sensitive to changes
in the economy, and they are less likely to survive adverse economic conditions.”
I investigate the firms’ innovation activity and efficiency of different ownership
sectors. Ownership influence on R&D investment and efficiency is estimated, using
productivity frontier function, for a sample of large and medium size Chinese industrial
enterprises from 2000-2007. I found that the presence of state ownership is positively
related to R&D investment, but negatively related to R&D performance. Foreign firms
are technical leader in Chinese industries and have advantage in R&D efficiency. My
results also show significant cross industries differences in R&D effort and technical
level. These point out that firms possessing more innovation resources and government
support are not the ones performing better technically.
I extend my study into a more general mixed duopoly model in which a wel-
fare maximizing public firm competes with profit maximizing private firm in R&D. I
assume that different operation strategy influence firms’ tolerance of R&D spillover
which plays a key role in their R&D investment mount and technology efficiency. I
prove that public firm is more likely to share its R&D fruit and its higher R&D invest-
ment is companied by lower efficiency.
Overall, macroeconomy on firm survival and ownership structure on firm inno-
vation activities are channels to understand Chinese economy reform. Because condi-
tions in China were similar in many ways to other transition economies, these results
provide important information about the process of economic transformation more
generally.
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervi-
sor, Prof. David Ulph. I have greatly appreciated his invaluable advice, continuous
support and encouragement throughout this research. Without his help and supervi-
sion, I would have wasted a lot of time in hesitating rather than digging into the data
and theories. His guidance has always been enlightening me when I was in the dark in
my research. Prof. David Ulph, always focused on theoretical analysis of innovation
behavior of firms. Under his supervision, I have paid my attention to the theoretical
analysis and thus have gained a much better understanding.
I would like to express my great thanks to my previous supervisor, Dr. Bhat-
tacharjee and new supervisor Dr. Barbopoulos. Dr. Bhattacharjee always gave me
huge support in empirical analysis and helped me to explore the rationality behind
seemingly irrational forms of firms’ behaviors. At the final stage of my PhD, Dr.Barbopoulos
gave me great support with thesis organization, results presentationand conclusions
drawing.
I wish to extend my thanks to many other people who also have enlightened
and helped me in my PhD studies. Prof. Kaushik Mitra has always given me encour-
agement and advice at the beginning of every semester. Dr. Peter Macmilliam, Prof.
John Beath and Dr. Laurence Lasselle taught me how to conduct tutorials and how to
present my ideas to the audience. Ms. Eliana Wilson, Ms. Caroline Moore and Ms.
Angela Hodge offered invaluable help during my postgraduate study. I am unable to
mention everything and everyone in this brief acknowledgement, but I shall not forget
you all and the student life in St Andrews.
I am very grateful to my fellow students and close friends. Because of your
presents and your friendship, my life has been colourful and energetic. Thank you
– Jevgeni Koltsov, Erven Lauw, Johannes Geissler, Ansgar Rannenberg , Liang Cao,
Yongyuan Qiao, for all the joy we have shared together. I will cherish your friendship
always.
Without the encouragement and support of my parents, I could not have pursued
the degree. Their love and forgiveness have been giving me strengths and courage
to pursue my dreams.. They have always believed in me. I wish I could share the
happiness of every achievement with them.
Finally I would like to thank the University of St Andrews as this research was
partly funded by the Arts Faculty Scholarship and Ministry of Education in China.
Without these supports, I would not have been able to finish the study.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.1 Economy reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Competition and financial distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Innovation and efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Financial Distress in Chinese Industry: Microeconomic,
Macroeconomic and Institutional Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Literature and institutional backdrop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.1 Firm-level factors and industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.2 Macroeconomic conditions and instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.3 Unobserved factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.4 Institutional backdrop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.1 Measure of financial distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.2 Macroeconomic conditions and instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.3 Firm-level and industry-level characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.1 Economic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.2 Econometrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5 Results and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5.1 Model estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5.2 Comparison with advanced economy studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.3 Policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3 Empirical Study of R&D Investment and Efficiency of
Chinese Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2 Literature review and institutional backdrop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.1 Ownership reform in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.1 Overview of R&D activities in entire large and medium enterprises 85
3.3.2 R&D activities across different ownership sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3.3 R&D activities in different industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Econometric models and variables choosing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4.1 R&D investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4.2 R&D output and efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.5 The empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.5.1 R&D investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5.2 R&D output and efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4 R&D Competition in A Mixed Duopoly Model, with
Endogenous Spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.3.1 Stage I R&D activites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.3.2 Stage II spillover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.3.3 Stage III product market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.4 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.4.1 R&D spillover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.4.2 R&D activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.5 Results explain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.5.1 R&D intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.5.2 R&D efficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.1 Summary of the research project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.2 Original contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.3 Suggestions for further research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
1Introduction
Since economic reforms started in 1978, the management conditions and own-
ership structures of Chinese enterprises have dramatically changed. Industry stands at
the core of China’s reform problem. Efforts to revitalize and restructure Chinese in-
dustry are closely linked to the liberalization of macroeconomic management, social
welfare and innovation system (Jefferson et al., 2000). Emerging as the world factory,
Chinese enterprises competitiveness related issues highly deserve to be paid attention
to. I would like to focus on firms’ behavior in the Chinese transition economy back-
ground. Specifically, I investigate the following two factors: survival and innovation.
This thesis attempts to examine enterprises’s survival conditions and R&D (research
and development) activities under the transforming economic background.
Chinese economy has exhibited a marked cyclical pattern during this massive
transition. Chinese firms are becoming more responsive to market signals, which al-
lows changes in the exchange rate, interest rate, and macro instability to influence the
performance of the firms. Undoubtedly, liberalization of economy has intensified com-
petition among all different types of firms and firms have to face market challenges and
financial pressures. Stronger competition diminishes flows of profits created by firms
and some of them are thrown into a position of financial loss. The study of influences
of macro, and institutional factors on firms’ financial distress has important policy
implications. In particular, it provides valuable insights into regulatory reform and de-
velopment of institutions in a transition economy context. Given the importance of the
2Chinese economy, understanding failure in Chinese industry is important for investors
and is useful for credit risk measurement and management for China, and for emerging
economies more generally.
Understanding survival of firms in Chinese industry is important for understand-
ing a transforming economy in which the state’s contribution is changing gradually
over macroeconomic control and microeconomic operation. Basically, market-oriented
powers, such as macroeconomic conditions and market competition have been becom-
ing increasingly important for firm operation condition (Lin et al., 1998). In addition,
general legal infrastructure building of bankruptcy implementation has been backing
the Chinese industry reform, and this may have important implications for firms’ be-
haviors (Harmer, 1996; Falke, 2007). An entirely new Bankruptcy Law has been pro-
mulgated in 2007, which is extend to apply to all types of firms. Competition then not
only rewarded winners, but also punished losers. State’s ability to protect losers from
the consequences of high cost, poor performance, neglecting of other legacies of plan-
ning has been significantly diminished. When government allows unsuccessful firms
to suffer the consequences of failure, enterprises must learn to compete, which will
create pressures to innovate.
It is well known that R&D has become increasingly important not only for in-
dividual firm’s survival and growth, but also the whole economy development. With
3China still transitioning from its central planning legacy, China’s government might be
anticipated to play an active role in financing and directing R&D. R&D efficiency and
R&D intensity or expenditure could be potential channels through which the owner-
ship effect on productivity is transmitted.
R&D activities across different ownership sectors is another issue to be ad-
dressed in this thesis. Innovation and industrial productivity change have attracted
considerable attention because they offer a convenient measure for the progress of re-
form. Productivity offers a more reliable gauge of long-term industrial performance
than profitability, particularly in transition economies (Jefferson et al., 2000).
R&D allows firms to develop new processes to produce existing goods more ef-
ficiently or indeed develop new products that allows them to expand sales and improve
market performance. Undoubtedly, Firms have strong incentives to compete over time
to develop new products or reduce their costs. A variety of evidence indicates that re-
form has substantially accelerated innovation in Chinese firms. There is a tendency
for large firms and enterprise groups to sacrifice current profit for longer-term strate-
gic advantage. Innovative activities in Chinese firms become more popular, the output
share of new products rose substantially during the 1980s (Jefferson et al., 1992).
Ownership structure and its concentration have important role in the firm’s strat-
egy of operating and innovation, due to it representing a source of power that can either
support or oppose manager’s incentives (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Outline of the
4thesis. As transition economy, diversified ownership plays a key role in understand-
ing behaviors of firms. The R&D activities of Chinese industrial firms is investigated
by dividing firms into different ownership groups. The hierarchy of financial and tech-
nological capacities of firms across different ownership sectors has been maintained
and even enlarged with the deepening of macro economy liberalization since economy
transformation in China. Compared to the non-state sectors, the state sector experi-
enced considerably slower productivity growth (Brandt and Zhu, 2000). Advantages
and disadvantages of different ownership sectors in this competition come clearly from
the nature of the Chinese institutional environment. Burdened with social responsibil-
ity, state sector is in a disadvantageous position to compete with non-state sectors in
the market (Dong and Putterman, 2003; Clarke, 2003; Bai et al., 2000). However,
compensated by state subsidies, protection, and easy access to bank debts, state owned
enterprises face smaller bankruptcy pressure than non-state owned enterprises, which
has enabled them to continue their social welfare maximizing aim instead of profit
maximizing (Qian and Xu, 1993).
The outline of the thesis can be summarized as following:
I review the literature on firm survival and R&D competition related issues in
the first chapter. In the review, I mainly focus on economy background, competition
and state protection, innovation and efficiency.
5In chapter 2, I examined the relationship between financial distress on the one
hand, and firm-level characteristics and the macroeconomic cycle on the other, focus-
ing on listed Chinese companies. The period of analysis, 1995-2006, has seen massive
regulatory and institutional changes in China, and evidenced substantial variation in
the business cycle and instability. State protection in China ensures that there are only
very few business exits. I develop a model of state protection in an economy with
high sunk costs and limited secondary market for acquired capital. Therefore, I con-
duct my analysis based on a synthetic measure of financial distress. Using hazard
regression analysis, I find important effects of firm-level characteristics such as age
of the firm, size, gearing and cash flow. In addition, I find an important effect of in-
stability in the interest rate, as well as important institutional effects. The results are
robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms
in similar macroeconomic founding conditions. Several important contributions have
been made to research issue about financial distress of Chinese enterprises. Given the
importance of the Chinese economy, understanding failure in Chinese industry is im-
portant for investors. While the macro economy is a potentially important determinant
of financial distress, the effect of macroeconomic conditions and instability on finan-
cial distress and exit has not been adequately studied in an emerging market context.
Thus, my research is useful for credit risk measurement and management for China,
and for emerging economies more generally. My research quantities the effect of in-
6stitutional factors, which are expected to be important against the backdrop of massive
economic transition experienced in China.
Chapter 3 has investigated the determinants of both the level of R&D spending
and the efficiency of this spending - the amount of innovative progress made in rela-
tion to the level of R&D spending - for a sample of large and medium size Chinese
industrial enterprises from 2000-2007. Using R&D investment regression model and
production frontier function, I found that the presence of state ownership is positively
related with R&D investment, but negatively related to R&D performance. Foreign
firms are technical leader in Chinese industries and have advantage in R&D efficiency.
These points out the fact that while the firms possessing more innovation resources
and government support - the state-owned enterprises - undertake more R&D, they
are not the ones performing better technically. Empirical results also show signifi-
cant cross industries differences in R&D investment and output. One important caveat
to the work reported in this Chapter is that since China is still transitioning from its
central planning legacy, the behavior of firms – particularly state-owned enterprises -
may be driven by beliefs and expectations (culture) that are still in a process of change
through the process of transition, and so the observed behavioural differences across
different ownership structures may be different from those that would be observed in
a longer-run steady-state outcome.
7Chapter 4 has been to provide a theoretical framework within which to try to
explain the key empirical finding of the previous Chapter. To explore this issue I
have used a mixed duopoly model that is a model in which there is one private-sector
profit-maximising firm and one state-owned enterprise pursuing a non-profit objective
of social welfare. Both firms undertake R&D which, in this model, is process (cost-
reducing) R&D. By endogenising the level of spillover I have been able to explain
the two key findings of the empirical research reported in my previous chapter: (1)
because of its higher spillover the public firm will see a higher return to its R&D than
the private firm and so do more of it; (2) because the private firm benefits from both the
higher R&D spend and the higher spillover of the public firm while the public firm gets
a minimum spillover from the lower level of R&D by the private firm, the total amount
of progress made by the public firm relative to its R&D is lower than the total amount
of progress made by the private firm in relation to its R&D. However, great care has to
be exercised in drawing policy conclusions from this research. Precisely because of the
public good nature of knowledge and the market failures can potentially arise through
the imperfect appropriability of knowledge, the fact that state-owned enterprises are
less privately efficient in their research than private sector firms does not mean that
they are less socially efficient and should be discouraged from doing research. From a
social point of view the state-owned enterprise is more efficient than the private sector
firm, and the fact that it also does more R&D is potentially a beneficial outcome.
8Chapter 5 summarise the results, discuss the original contributions and propose
the future research directions. This thesis focuses on understanding firms’ survival and
innovation in the transition economy from both the empirical and theoretical points of
view. My research has enriched both the empirical and theoretical literatures of tran-
sition economy, offer interesting points of comparison with related studies in western
economies, and highlight several policy implications. there are several lines of further
research emerge from my work. First, improve the empirical methods and results on
the research of firms financial distress research; Second, extend the model of research
on Firms’ R&D competition research, which will include the welfare aspects of the
R&D competition model.
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Literature Review
In this chapter, the background of research will be provided by investigating
the main characters of Chinese free economy reform, which are directly relate to
the two research questions of the thesis: which factors will influence the survival of
enterprises, and how enterprises will react on increasing competition. Surveying of
literatures will also focus on the survival and innovation of the enterprises.
1.1 Economy reform
The Chinese free economy reform strategy is characterized as to develop the Chinese
economy as rapidly as possible within the basic framework of state socialism and
its political governance structure. This approach determines that China’s reform has
been partial, gradual and experimental in nature (Bell et al., 1993). The Chinese
economy has fundamentally changed since reform, which can be summarized both
in macro economy reforms and diversified ownership structures at enterprises level.
The research questions of this thesis come from and are carried under this economic
background.
Chinese economy transforming from a rigid central-planned economy to a
market-oriented economy has improved the sensitivity of the economy system and
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Chinese economy has exhibited a market cyclical pattern: periods of rapid growth,
accompanied by accelerating inflation, followed by prolonged contractions during
which the growth rate and inflation decline in tandem (Naughton, 1995; Yusuf,1994;
Brandt, 2000). During this massive transition, Chinese firms are becoming more re-
sponsive to market signals, which allows changes in the exchange rate, interest rate,
and macro instability to influence the performance of the firms (Zhang, 1999; Boren-
sztein and Ostry, 1996; Chow and Li, 2002). 2
Financial market has been developing gradually. China moves toward a more
commercial banking system, a number of necessary reforms remain for improving
the quality of new lending by commercial banks (Bonin and Huang, 2001). Most of
the financial reforms were implemented from mid-1994 to mid-1995; all had the po-
tential to increase the commercial orientation of the banking system. Three policy
banks were established in 1994 to separate policy from commercial lending, and the
establishment of a national, unified interbank market, which enabled the commercial
banks to become more commercial. The new Commercial Bank Law came into effect
in 1995. Towards 2006, the year bank sector will be opened to foreign investors ac-
cording to the WTO agreement, two of the biggest banks, BOC (Bank of China) and
CCB (China Commercial Bank) have been incorporated as joint listed stock compa-
2 Unconditional convertibility of RMB on current account has been implemented since 1996. China’s
foreign exchange system has been, since the mid-1980s, classified as a more flexible management sys-
tem. Recent Movements of Effective Exchange Rates of the Chinese Yuan was kept to fix to the US
dollar under the dollar peg system before July 21, 2005. On one hand, it was fluctuating against other
major trade partners’ currencies. After the announcement of Chinese exchange rate system reform, it
is a little fluctuating against the US dollar as well as other major trade partners’ currencies. Accord-
ingly, a value of the Chinese yuan in terms of trade partners’ currencies, that is effective exchange
rate, has been fluctuating over time.(Ogawa, 2006)
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nies and new corporate governance structures, risk management and foreign strategic
investors have been introduced.
The Chinese government has to abandon inappropriate administrative interven-
tions which have been implemented for a long time and adopt more practical macro-
economic policies and microeconomic regulations that conform to a market econ-
omy (Lin et al., 1998). Firms operations now face growing uncertainty about the
price shocks, and tight monetary policy in the background that legal system is being
strengthened and transparent. Profitability and cost control have become more dis-
ciplined by firms in their short-run and long-run production plans. In a study of the
emerging managerial market in China, Groves et al. (1994) examine the incentives
of state owned enterprises (SOEs) managers and find that managerial compensation
is more closely linked to firm profit after the reform.
In the 1990s, the focus of the SOE reform shifted from the expansion of man-
agerial autonomy to the restructuring of property rights and corporate governance
arrangements. A variety of privatization programmes, from spontaneous privatiza-
tion to informal privatization, progressed under different nomenclatures (Cao et al.,
1999; Ma, 1998). As for property-rights reform, "shareholding system" has been
chosen as a means for reforming state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the green light
has been given to massive privatization, which was announced in Fifteenth Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in September 1997. President Jiang Zemin
made most striking statement to the CCP’s Fifteenth Congress as follows: "Pub-
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lic ownership can and should be realized in many possible institutional forms." He
explained: "In general terms, the shareholding system cannot be considered either
public ownership or private ownership. It all depends on who has a controlling stake
in the shares."(CCP Fifteenth Congress Report, 1997).
In the meanwhile, spectacular expansion of non-state sector has attracted the
notice of policy makers and economists. With poor applicable legal and financial
system, the private sector grows much faster than the state sector, and provides most
of the economic growth (Allen et al., 2005). In 1980, contribution of private sec-
tor firms is almost negligible, but in 2008 it was 27% of total industrial output. Even
some of the small loss-making SOEs from non-key industries were sold to the private
owners when policy ‘seizing on the big and letting go the small’ was implemented
in 1990s. Private sector has become an important source for employment opportu-
nities (Jefferson et al., 2000). As can be seen from the figure 1.1, private sector has
overtaken the public sector and become the most important employers in China labor
market since 2006.
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Figure 1.1 Employees Number in Different Ownership
Sectors (10,000 Person)
Note. SOEs-State Owned Enterprises, PVTs-Private Owned Enterprises, HKTs-
Enterprises owned by investors from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, FORs-
Foreign Owned Enterprises.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistics Year Book 2009.
As part of China’s open policy, first appeared in special economic zones, for-
eign and joint venture capital have become inseparable parts in China economy. From
1978, China has gradually become one of the biggest FDI recipient and received $90
billion in 2009.
The spectacular expansion of the non-state sector has been a major source of
success for China’s economic reforms. Other ownership sectors have challenged the
control position of state owned sector in terms of output, investment and productivity
(Rawski, 1994; Lardy, 1995). From figure 1.2, we can see that private and foreign
sectors have much higher output growth rates than state sector from 1999 to 2008.
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Figure 1.2 Output Growth Rate in Different Sectors
Note. SOEs-State Owned Enterprises, PVTs-Private Owned Enterprises, HKTs-
Enterprises owned by investors from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, FORs-
Foreign Owned Enterprises.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistics Year Book 2009.
It appears that China has no coherent reform programs, no commitment to pri-
vate ownership, and no changes in the political system, and China’s economy is still
not fully liberalized. From both the theoretical and policy perspectives, China’s dif-
ferent reform strategies and outstanding reform performances are particularly inter-
esting and puzzling (He et al., 2004). The path and forms that China has taken to
transform its economy is far from conventional: neither its legal nor financial system
is well developed by existing standards, yet it is one of the fastest growing economies
(Allen et al., 2005).
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1.2 Competition and financial distress
Product market competition makes profit more sensitive to managerial effort, reduces
agency cost and enhances investment efficiency. Temptation to retain cash and en-
gage in less productive activities is less severe for firms in more competitive environ-
ment (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). Competition, by reducing information asym-
metry enjoyed by enterprises, makes their performance easier to interpret (Holm-
strom and Milgrom, 1991). As long as managers and employees are adversely af-
fected by poor performance (through performance incentives), competition can make
them work hard. Level of investor protection, including the extent of board indepen-
dence, the ability of a board to dismiss managers following poor performance and the
degree of shareholder activism, are negatively related to agency cost and positively
related to firm’s performance (Weisbach, 1988). If a company is badly managed,
then there is an incentive for someone to acquire a large stake of the company, im-
prove its performance and profit on the shares purchased. The threat of such action
can persuade managers to act in the interest of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). Jensen (1986) and Stultz (1990) also state that the threat of bankruptcy im-
poses a hard budget constraint on managers and limits managers’ control over firm’s
free cash flows. When managers are faced with choices of reducing empire-building
and lavish perquisites or going bankrupt, they are likely to choose the first option.
Therefore, leverage reduces agency cost of managerial discretion.
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The legal framework for enterprises reform is comprehensive as enterprises
reform requires changes in many areas of economic behavior. Protection of creditor
rights as well as general legal infrastructure has been lacking in the Chinese economy.
This may have important implications for business failure and greatly weakens the
market disciplinary function through takeover since there is virtually no threat of an
alternative management team that can offer a better return for the current firm’s asset,
no matter how unsatisfactory the firm’s performance is.
Under central planning system, State sector was the heart of China socialist
economy and dominated the economy in all the key aspects. All Chinese enter-
prises were state-owned and overseen by a complex system of administrative bu-
reaus. The state used firms to generate revenues, and freely redistributed resources
to enact policies and to subsidize unprofitable firms (Jefferson and Xu, 1991). The
profitability of state owned enterprises (SOEs) declined substantially since the re-
form because dissipation of the monopoly rent, which they had benefited for decades
from preferential allocations of funds, equipment, foreign exchange, university grad-
uates, skilled labor, and scarce materials. There is no indication that the reform of
SOEs is completely successful, the essential features of their governance structure
(soft budget constraint, government intervention, and the employment relationship)
have remained intact (Dong and Putterman, 2002 and 2003). SOEs have soft bud-
get constraint: they are not forced to cover expenses from sales and income, and
they receive credit from state-owned banks for reasons unrelated to risk (Kornai,
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1986). Managers are not concerned about survival, but like firms in other redistrib-
utive economies (Kornai, 1986). By the early 1990s, SOEs losses had begun to spin
out of control (Lardy, 1998). As statistics support that more than 30% of the state
firms incur explicit financial losses and are increasingly reliant on government sub-
sidies (Bai et al., 1997). Large amount of implicit subsidies from low-interest loans
and direct subsidies are tapped into the SOEs every year. Between 1979 and 1993,
on average, 84 percent of all new credits from the state banking system were allo-
cated to the state sector. More than one quarter of the loans of four Chinese major
state owned banks are nonperforming and that these banks are technically insolvent
(Lardy, 1998). Citing Chinese sources, Lardy (1998) estimates that 42% of special-
ized bank loans in 1991 were policy loans. Park (2001) also find that the importance
of policy lending by state banks did not fall during from 1991 to 1997 and that lend-
ing by financial institutions did not respond to economic fundamentals.
Problems such as Official interference in credit decisions, weak control over
lending, and accumulation of bad debts by major banks for insolvent enterprises can
not be cured overnight (Goldie-Scott, 1995). The Asian financial crisis has height-
ened scrutiny of Chinese state banking system, whose fragility stems from the con-
tinued use of the financial system to support urban-based, state owned enterprises
(Brandt and Zhu, 2000). In the mid-1990s, the Chinese authorities engaged in a se-
ries of reforms to deal with the bad loans problem. Four AMCs (Asset management
companies) were established as temporary institutions to deal with bad loans in 1999.
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The likely beneficial effects of competition may not materialize because, with-
out bankruptcy for Chinese enterprises, they could avoid paying the ultimate price
for bad performance. Allocation of effective control rights to management without
clearly defined corporate laws and bankruptcy procedures gives managers a chance
to enrich themselves. The Chinese bankruptcy code, first introduced for SOEs in
1986, was gradually extended to other private firms in informal ways (Harmer, 1996;
Falke, 2007). A more extensive law governing bankruptcy and reorganisations for all
enterprises has recently been introduced. Adoption of a new bankruptcy law would
provide sufficient protection to creditors.
Further reform of enterprises strengthening their governance and financial dis-
cipline is in agenda. Strengthening market discipline, coupled with the transparent
institutional system has left the state with little choice but to push the innovation and
efficiency of industries.
1.3 Innovation and efficiency
Measures of industrial productivity have attracted considerable attention because
they offer a convenient measure for the progress of reform. Productivity offers a
more reliable gauge of long-term industrial performance than profitability, particu-
larly in transition economies (Jefferson et al., 2000).
During the reform, China has achieved spectacular productivity growth and
productivity growth has rapidly replaced capital input as the predominant source of
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economic growth in China. Production frontier can be expanded by improving dy-
namic efficiency through the adoption of new products, new processes, and new or-
ganizational arrangements (Hu and Khan, 1997). There is a long-term upward trend
in total factor productivity across major ownership segments in all industries from
1980 to 1996 (Jefferson et al., 2000). A variety of evidences indicate that reform has
substantially accelerated innovation in Chinese state owned enterprises. There is a
tendency for large state owned firms and enterprise groups to sacrifice current profit
for longer-term strategic advantage and the output share of new products of these
firms rose substantially during the 1980s (Jefferson et al., 1992).
As compared to their own past, state owned enterprises (SOEs) performance
has improved in terms of increased productivity (Chen et al., 1988; Groves et al.,
1994); on the other hand, as compared to firms of joint ventures, private enterprises,
and township-village enterprises (TVEs), SOEs clearly lagged in economic efficiency
(Jefferson and Rawski, 1994; Woo et al., 1993). Due to the erosion of barriers which
formerly protected state enterprises against competition from other firms, imported
products and innovative rivals within the state sector, SOEs’ profit has been observed
reduced sharply (Naughton, 1992).
Being outsiders to the traditional system, non-state enterprises have to obtain
credits and inputs from competitive markets, and in turn, their products are sold
to markets. They face hard budget constraints, and they would not survive if their
performances were poor. Productivity in China’s nonstate sector grew more than
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twice as fast as in the state sector between 1980 and 1992 (Jefferson and Rawski,
1994). However most of non-state firms are still relatively small compared to large
and medium sized SOEs and their ability to invest in R&D is limited (Lin et al.,
1998).
The dynamism of non-state enterprises exerted a heavy pressure on the SOEs
and triggered the state’s policy of deepening the SOEs managerial reforms. Firm-
level studies show that the increase in managerial autonomy and the intensification
of competition have significantly improved the managerial incentives and total factor
productivity of SOEs (Li, 1997). Zhang et al. (2003) find that state ownership leads
to lower R&D and productive efficiency in industrial firms. Bai et al. (1997) attribute
the apparent paradox of rising productivity and falling profitability in China’s state
sector to declining returns to scale and weak pursuit of profits within the state sector.
Chinese SOEs appear to behave significantly differently from other local-owned
firms with respect to imitation, innovation and competition (Child, 1994; Pan and
Parker, 1997). SOEs are generally more capable of generating economies of scale
and scope than other local non-state sectors given the fact that the former have softer
budget constraints and privileged access to resources to fiscal subsidies, notably fi-
nancial capital from state banks, and have been encouraged by government to im-
prove their technological capacity (Qian and Roland, 1996; Coady and Wang, 2000;
Bruun and Bennett, 2002). But other sectors are less restricted by administrative di-
rectives. Thus, the distinctive institutional features of the different enterprise sectors
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have their own merits and defects with respect to the impact on efficiency perfor-
mance (Lo, 1999).
In addition, R&D may prove to be important in determining the long-term
labour productivity of foreign firms in China (Bruun and Bennett, 2002). State-
owned firms also appear to have gained from competition with both foreign- and
other local-owned firms.
The above patterns of innovation and efficiency revolution are largely con-
sistent with the current configuration of the ownership structure in China and with
knowledge about the nature of economic structure and reforms in the Chinese manu-
facturing sector.
Through the lens of the theory of the firm, a firm’s productivity is affected by
its market structure and various ownership or control rights, such as cash flow rights,
internal and managerial incentives, and production decision rights (Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1993). Bai et al. (1997) point out that efficiency is determined by both the
firm’s technology and its operating decisions. It uses a simple model to show that
when the objective of the manager differs from that of profit maximization for what-
ever reason, higher productivity can induce distorted behavior that partially or totally
offsets efficiency gains from improved technology.
After years of reform, SOEs are found that they still have not yet assigned
profit a proper weight in their objectives and government instructions have strong in-
fluence on their operation decision. SOEs have been used for purposes other than the
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profit maximization for shareholders - such as the maintenance of urban employment
levels, direct control over sensitive industries, or politically motivated job placement
(Clarke, 2003). Bai et al. (2000) point out that during transition, SOEs are charged
with the multitasks of social welfare provision and efficient production.
China’s reformist leaders understand the importance of maintaining social sta-
bility for the success of reform. Specifically, they have made it very clear that they
do not see mass layoffs as an appropriate solution to the surplus labor problem in
SOEs. According to Shleifer and Vishny’s theory, when politicians have direct con-
trol over the operation of SOEs, there is likely to be more labor redundancy. In fact,
there is strong evidence that excess employment in Chinese SOEs was large (Dong
and Putterman, 2002). Bai et al. (2000) predict that private enterprises do not have
any incentive to employ surplus labor to help maintain social stability, and this is
indeed the case in China.
This in turn creates several problems. First, there are incentive problems: the
presence of multiple tasks often dulls the intensity of incentives (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991). Second, many of these goals are not easily measured and there is
no obvious way of balancing them one against the other. This creates monitoring
difficulties. Second, the policy of continued state involvement sets up a conflict of
interest between the state as controlling shareholder and other shareholders. In using
its control for purposes other than value maximization, the state exploits minority
shareholders who have no other way to benefit from their investment (Clarke, 2003).
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Competition in the product market is widely believed to be an important safe-
guard for the efficiency of firms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Stiglitz, 1993). But
because Chinese SOEs still have to bear many policy-determined burdens which
cause the competition between SOEs and their counterparts in the non-state sector
to be unfair and SOEs have therefore become less competitive in the market (Lin et
al., 1998).
24
Chapter 2
Financial Distress in Chinese Industry:
Microeconomic, Macroeconomic and
Institutional Influences
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter3, I investigate the impact of microeconomic factors and macroeco-
nomic conditions, as well as institutional influences, on financial distress of Chinese
listed firms. Using hazard regression analysis, I find substantial effect of firm level
covariates (age, size, cash flow and gearing) on financial distress, but also a signif-
icant role for macroeconomic stability. Further, there are important institutional ef-
fects where, holding other factors constant, the hazard rate of financial distress varies
with the stock exchange where the firm is listed. However, the effect of state owner-
ship is not statistically significant. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity
at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar macroeconomic founding
conditions. Comparison of these results with related studies for western economies
highlight several important policy implications.
3 This chapter is from CRIEFF working paper 1001, University of St Andrews, which is cooperate
paper with Dr. Arnab Bhattacharjee.
Dr Bhattacharjee advised me on the econometric methodology and discussed with me the best way
of measuring financial distress. I assembled the data, executed all the econometric regressions etc and
was responsible for writing up the results that would go a long way to reassure them.
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Following Chan and Chen (1991), financially distressed firms “have lost market
value because of poor performance, they are inefficient producers, and they are likely
to have high financial leverage and cash flow problems. They are marginal in the
sense that their prices tend to be more sensitive to changes in the economy, and they
are less likely to survive adverse economic conditions.” Therefore, investors demand
a premium for holding such risky stocks and expect to be rewarded for bearing the
risk.
Typically, financial distress of the above nature is measured by the probabil-
ity of failure (Altman, 1993; Shumway, 2001). However, despite being financially
distressed many firms do not exit. In the US, distressed firms often file for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, or de-list for performance related reasons,
without necessarily going out of business (Campbell et al., 2008). One of the rea-
sons is the protectionist stance of bankruptcy codes (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a).
Likewise, business exits in my data on Chinese quoted firms are vanishingly rare,
arguably because of active state protection for the failing firm.
The divergence between exits and financial distress is closely related to the
distinction between fixed and sunk costs. While both sunk costs and fixed costs are
independent of firm output, they have different implications for firm exits (Owen and
Ulph, 2002). Fixed costs relate to assets that are valuable to other firms, and therefore
can be traded in the secondary market. By contrast, sunk costs involve assets that are
valuable solely to the firm that creates them and unlike fixed costs, entail exit costs.
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Thus, an incumbent firm exits only if its operating profit covers the fixed costs, but
not necessarily its sunk costs plus fixed costs; in the latter case, it will be financially
distressed.
Measurement of financial distress must recognize the above distinction with
failure. In this chapter, I construct my own indicator for financial distress at the firm
level. This indicator measures the degree to which operating profits cover the finan-
cial costs of the firm, the total of debt obligations relating to firm-specific assets (sunk
costs) and other capital assets (fixed costs), controlling for the possibility that some
firms may undergo rapid expansion by accumulating debt. Against the institutional
setting of active state protection, I develop a simple economic model of financial dis-
tress, where firms receive protection in the form of a guaranteed threshold return on
their capital. Finally, I use my measure to study macroeconomic, microeconomic and
institutional influences on firm turnover.
This paper makes several important contributions. First, I develop a model of
state protection in an economy with high sunk costs and limited secondary market for
acquired capital. Testable implications are verified using duration data on financial
distress. Second, given the importance of the Chinese economy, understanding fail-
ure in Chinese industry is important for investors. Third, while the macroeconomy is
a potentially important determinant of financial distress, the effect of macroeconomic
conditions and instability on financial distress and exit has not been adequately stud-
ied in an emerging market context. Thus, my research is useful for credit risk mea-
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surement and management for China, and for emerging economies more generally.
Fourth, my research quantifies the effect of institutional factors, which are expected
to be important against the backdrop of massive economic transition experienced in
China. Last but not the least, the current study provides a basis for comparison with
related research for advanced economies. In particular, my comparative analysis pro-
vides valuable insights into regulatory reform and development of institutions in a
transition economy context.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and dis-
cusses the institutional background, while the data and variable construction are de-
scribed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses economic model of financial distress and the
empirical framework for analysis. I discuss the estimated hazard regression models
in Section 5, focussing on comparison with related studies for advanced economies
and implications for policy. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature and institutional backdrop
In this section, Surveying of theoretical and empirical literatures will focus on the im-
portance of macro-, firm- and industry-specific factors on financial distress, defaults
and exits. The institutional background of research will also be provided by investi-
gating the liberalization of Chinese economy, industrial reforms, as well as changes
in the legal framework.
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2.2.1 Firm-level factors and industry
There is a large theoretical and empirical microeconomic literature pointing to the
importance of firm- and industry-specific factors on financial distress, defaults and
exits; see Siegfried and Evans (1994) and Caves (1998) for reviews. Indeed, cur-
rent theories of industrial organisation (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Jovanovic, 1982;
Hopenhayn, 1992) predict that exit rates may decline with firm age and size. Consis-
tent with the above theoretical models of firm-level learning, the credit scoring liter-
ature has highlighted financial ratios including leverage, cash flow, and profitability,
in addition to firm age, size and industry, as determinants of failure, with binary re-
sponse models providing the basis for probability scores of company failure (Taffler,
1982; Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Lennox, 1999). Similarly, current theories and
empirical of industrial organization highlights the importance of industry conditions;
see, for example, Dunne et al. (1988), Audretsch (1995), Baldwin (1995) and Caves
(1998).
2.2.2 Macroeconomic conditions and instability
At the same time as microeconomic factors are important, firm defaults increase dra-
matically during economic downturns (Fama, 1986; Carty and Fons, 1993; Koopman
and Lucas, 2005). More generally, macroeconomic conditions have good explanatory
power for corporate defaults and are useful in modeling credit risk; see, for example,
Nickell et al. (2000), Bangia et al. (2002), Allen and Saunders (2003) and Carling
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et al. (2004). Default can be triggered either because the idiosyncratic shock has
reached the default threshold in a given regime or because of a change in the value
of the aggregate shock. The second type provides a rationale for clustering of exit
decisions observed in many markets (Hackbarth et al., 2006).
The economic cycle (and in particular, macroeconomic indicators such as in-
terest rate, unemployment rate and retail sales) has been found to affect profitabil-
ity, gearing, cash flow and thereby influence company failures (Everett and Watson,
1998; Hackbarth et al., 2006). Firm exits through compulsory liquidation increase
during periods of severe downturn in the aggregate economy (Caballero and Ham-
mour, 1994), particularly if the downturn is driven by demand shocks. Variations
in the macroeconomic environment significantly affect the financial performance of
firms as well (Machin and van Reenen, 1993; Higson et al., 2002, 2004).
Young (1995) examines the effect of changes in interest rates on insolvencies,
and finds that companies are vulnerable to unanticipated changes in real interest rates;
see also Wadhwani (1986). Similarly, Goudie and Meeks (1991) simulate the finan-
cial statements of UK firms, contingent on macroeconomic conditions, and observe
significant asymmetric and non-linear impact of the exchange rate upon failure rates.
Koopman and Lucas (2005) provide further empirical evidence of a link between
business cycles and default at the firm level, while Ferri et al. (2001) report cyclical
behaviour of ratings agencies.
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In addition to aggregate macroeconomic conditions, instability also plays an
important role. Lenders are often less willing to lend when there is higher instabil-
ity (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990), increasing credit constraints on firms and leading
some firms to financial distress. Further, in the presence of credit constraints, the
effect of uncertainty on business performance may be asymmetric (Bernanke and
Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b) examine
firm exits through bankruptcies and acquisitions, for listed firms in the UK and the
US, and find that both modes of exit depend on the macroeconomic environment, par-
ticularly, macroeconomic instability. At the same time, legal institutions can reduce
the devastating effects of a large negative shock (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a).
2.2.3 Unobserved factors
The empirical literature on firm dynamics has generally acknowledged the impor-
tance of unobserved heterogeneity in understanding firm exits. In the US shipbuild-
ing industry, Thompson (2005) finds an important role for unobserved variation in
initial experience. Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) study the role of unobserved human
capital in entrepreneurial choice and its impact on the survival of newly created firms.
Other important factors discussed in the literature include intangibles and R&D in-
vestments, often unobserved in emerging economies.
It is therefore important to recognize the role of unobserved heterogeneity on
the financial fragility of firms. Such heterogeneity in the founding conditions of
31
firms may be related both to entrepreneurial human capital and to macroeconomic
conditions at the time of incorporation.
2.2.4 Institutional backdrop
Over the past 30 years, the Chinese economy has been going through complex trans-
formation from a centrally planned towards a market economy. The liberalization
of the macroeconomy has played an important part in this transformation. This is
in addition to industrial reforms, particularly for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as
well as changes in the legal framework. These developments are important for under-
standing financial distress and survival of firms in Chinese industry. While the pace
of reforms has been gentle, it has been argued that the gradualist approach of retain-
ing policies and institutional arrangements that are supposed to be highly inimical to
economic activity4 have worked to the benefit of Chinese industry (Rodrik, 2006);
see also Blanchard and Kremer (1997), Roland and Verdier (1999) and Qian (2003).
In 1996, current account convertibility in the Yuan Renminbi (RMB) was ini-
tiated, but the capital account is still under restricted control. The foreign exchange
market has therefore remained relatively underdeveloped, especially the derivatives
market. This has potentially undermined the ability of Chinese companies to guard
against exchange rate shocks. Further, the undervalued and relatively fixed exchange
rate regime has encouraged import substitution. The Chinese economy has, therefore,
4 For example, absence of private property rights, state trading, substantial public ownership and
high barriers to trade.
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become more dependent on exports and the industry more vulnerable to fluctuations
in the external sector (Aziz and Li, 2007). At the same time, export performance of
Chinese industry has been consistently robust, pointing to a remarkable capability to
mitigate against adverse shocks in the external sector.
Similarly, while real interest rates have been relatively volatile, the likely im-
pact of resulting instability on Chinese companies is by no means clear. For one,
Chinese industry appears to have had substantial state protection against interest rate
shocks, particularly the SOEs (Goodhart and Xu, 1996).5 Also, it has been argued
that nonperforming loans, borrowing constraints, and uncertainty in regulations relat-
ing to bank lending have promoted large transfers from households to firms, keeping
cost of capital low and encouraging investment (Aziz, 2008). On the other hand, a
very high debt rate and predominance of borrowing under floating interest rates may
render Chinese industry particularly susceptible to volatility in interest rates. The
bank loan control issue makes it very difficult for private firms to obtain funding and
results in a host of problems because access to credit is very important to all enter-
prises. This phenomenon occurs since the four state-owned commercial banks are the
largest credit institutions and control more than 70% of total assets available (mainly
deposits and loans). According to a 2002 World Bank study, 80 percent of Chinese
companies reported problems in obtaining capital (Huang and Khanna, 2003).
5 Sometimes, state protection is rather explicit. Over the period 1998-2001, Chinese SOEs were
shielded against increasing interest rates by debt-equity swaps and discounts in lending rates.
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Important reforms were also instituted in the SOE sector (Zhang, 2004). Since
1994, the state has maintained a policy whereby large SOEs are more actively pro-
tected at the cost of smaller ones. Also, a disconnect between ownership and control
has been actively promoted for SOEs. Nevertheless, substantial agency problems
exist, in addition to problems due to political controls (Zhang, 2004).
Protection of creditor rights as well as general legal infrastructure has been
lacking in the Chinese economy, and this may have important implications for finan-
cial distress and business failure. The important role of legislation in cross-country
differences in firm exits has been noted in the literature (Brouwer, 2006; Bhattachar-
jee et al., 2009a). The Chinese bankruptcy code, first introduced for SOEs in 1986,
was gradually extended to other collective and private firms (Harmer, 1996; Falke,
2007). A more extensive law governing bankruptcy and reorganisations for all enter-
prises has recently been introduced. A different bankruptcy system was introduced
in 1994, aimed mainly at regulating mergers, restructuring and bankruptcy of state-
owned firms in key industries. The mechanism is entirely state controlled, includ-
ing periodic selection of key industries and specific firms, as well as firm specific
bankruptcy procedures. The workers laid off from such selected firms are offered
first preference to the proceeds from the sell-out of these firms in preference to the
debtors; as a result, they obtain much higher compensation than similar workers laid
off through the standard bankruptcy code. These idiosyncratic and selective aspects
of state protection of Chinese firms in bankruptcty have potentially important impli-
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cations for our study. This is particularly relevant against the finding in Guariglia and
Poncet (2008) that financial distortions introduced by state interventions in China is
an important impediment to economic growth and development.
2.3 Data
The empirical analysis uses financial data on Chinese quoted firms extracted from
Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database.6 I include the S] XR[ nonfinancial firms listed at
any time over the period under study – 1995 to 2006.7 Compared with other datasets,
the above data are unique in that they offer complete coverage of listed Chinese firms
(and therefore do not suffer from potential selection biases), and contain information
on ownership and exits, in addition to financial accounting variables. Admittedly, the
incidence of exits and financial distress would be higher if I was to include private un-
listed firms. However, in line with the literature (Campbell et al., 2008; Bhattacharjee
et al., 2009a,b), I focus on listed firms for which financial distress has important im-
plications for price premiums on stocks.
6 Bureau Van Dijk’s Osiris database (van Dijk, 2003) provides financial accounts for the world’s
publicly quoted companies (more than TV] RRR).
7 Listed in either of the three stock exchanges – Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong, or in a foreign
exchange. There are five categories of shares issued by listed Chinese companies – A, B, H, N and
S shares. While A shares are issued in the domestic markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen) and traded
in Chinese currency (RMB), B shares are stocks in the domestic market that are traded in foreign
currencies. H shares, N shares and S shares refer to Chinese firms listed in Hongkong, New York
and Singapore stock exchanges respectively. My data comprises all of these categories, as well as
companies whose stocks are listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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Notably, only Y firm exits are recorded in the Osiris database.8 At the same
time, there are many firms which have survived periods of vanishingly low interest
cover, concurrently with substantial depletion in both fixed assets and share capital.
Note that, a reduction in fixed assets is not necessarily associated with distress, espe-
cially in the Chinese context where some firms have tended to overinvest in the past,
and have undergone restructuring more recently. However, such restructuring would
typically be associated with reduced debt obligations. Therefore, it is highly unlikely
that a sharp fall in assets will be concurrent with decline in interest cover, particularly
if the firm also experienced fall in share capital at the same time. It may be presumed
that such firms suffered from immense financial distress, and were saved from liqui-
dation only through substantial state protection. I, therefore, base my analysis on a
synthetic indicator of financial distress at the firm level.
Some comparison of Chinese delisting with those in other studies would be
useful. For example, reorganization system such as US Chapter 11 can be used to
decouple liquidation by providing a place where failing firms can shelter and, in
some cases, wait for acquisition markets to become active again. Bhattacharjee et al.
(2009b) examine the effect of the legal system on liquidation for both US and UK
listed firms over a comparable period by using a competing risks hazard regression
framework. They find the UK is an economy that is institutionally similar to the
8 According to official sources, VZ companies were delisted (WS stocks) from the domestic exchanges
(Shanghai and Shenzhen) between 1990 and 2006. This, too, is a very small number compared to the
size of the quoted population.
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US, but without any equivalent system to Chapter 11. Effectively, bankruptcy leads
directly to liquidation in the UK, whereas bankruptcy has a binary outcome in the
US - a failing firm can be liquidated under Chapter 7 or reorganized under Chapter
11. They also find the impact of instability on bankruptcy is strong in UK, it is much
weaker in the US. When they partition US bankruptcies into Chapter 7 and Chapter
11, they find that the difference in responsiveness to macroeconomic instability is
largely attributable to the use of reorganization under Chapter 11.
Below I describe data construction, including the indicator of financial distress,
measures of macroeconomic conditions and instability, and firm and industry char-
acteristics.
2.3.1 Measure of financial distress
The credit scoring literature has developed a wide range of measures for financial dis-
tress, typically used in bankruptcy prediction; see Altman (1993) and Allen and Saun-
ders (2003) for extensive reviews. In the spirit of Zmijewski (1984) and Shumway
(2001), I construct my own indicator for financial distress at the firm level.
The detection of company operating and financial difficulties is a subject which
has been particularly susceptible to financial ratio analysis. Traditional distress scores
incorporate ratios measuring profitability, liquidity, and solvency, Such as: Sales/Total
assets, Working capital/Total assets, Market value of equity/Book value of total debt.
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The order of their importance is not clear since almost every study cited a different
ratio as being the most effective indication of impending problems.
Altman’s (1968) model is perhaps the best known of the early studies. He
developed an equation that optimally combined five ratios reflecting accounting and
market data, namely, liquidity, profitability, financial leverage, solvency, and sales
activity (i.e., sales to total assets).
The Sales/total assets ratio or capital-turnover ratio are standard financial ratio
illustrating the sales generating ability of the firm’s assets. It is one measure of man-
agement’s capability in dealing with competitive conditions. But many firms which
suffer temporary profitability difficulties, actuality do not become bankrupt.
Ordinarily, a firm experiencing consistent operating losses will have shrinking
current assets in relation to total assets. Of the three liquidity ratios evaluated, this
one proved to be the most valuable.
In a recent evaluation of the discriminate function, Cochran concluded that in
the bankrupt group is that as firms suffer losses and deteriorate toward failure, their
assets are not replaced as much as in healthier times, and also the cumulative losses
have further reduced the asset size through debits to retained earnings. The asset size
reduction apparently dominates any sales movements.
Because the market equity of firms that are close to bankruptcy is typically
discounted by traders, firm size is a very important bankruptcy predicting variable
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(Shumway, 2001). Zmijewski’s (1984) finds that firms with high income and low
liabilities are less likely to fail than other firms.
Andrade and Kaplan( 1997) define financial distress as the first year that a firm
has EBITDA less than interest expense, attempts to restructure its debt, or defaults.
They examine the factors that drive the sample firms into financial distress and find
that high leverage is the primary cause of distress. Poor firm performance and then,
poor industry performance play much smaller roles. More importantly, all of their
sample firms have positive operation income in the year they are distressed. In fact,
the operating margin of the typical firm exceeds the median for its industry. In their
sample, a number of firms are forced to curtail their capital expenditures, sometimes,
substantially. And a number of firms appear to sell assets at depressed prices.
Consider the analysis made above of these indicators and given the specific
context of Chinese industry, my measure combines a debt sustainability measure (in-
terest cover) with evidence that assets and equity in the firm is decreasing. Specifi-
cally, I consider the following three conditions:
0 Interest cover ^ R\Y 9(in current or previous year),
9 The choice of 0.7 as a cut-off is ad-hoc. The traditional cut-off would be 1.0, meaning that firms
below this cut-off would be unable to meet their debt obligations and become bankrupt. The ratio
has been traditionally used as a measure of financial distress and determinant of bankruptcy; see, for
example, DeAngelo et al. (2002). However, in the Chinese institutional context, state owned banks
would frequently allow firms below this cut-off to continue operations. In fact, over the years under
analysis, about 15% of the firms had a interest cover below 1.0, while only a handful of firms had
ceased operations. In a related institutional context, Huang (2009) find that the average interest cover
of non-defaulting public construction firms in Taiwan during 1999 and 2006 was 0.58, while the
same for defaulting firms was -0.02.
I chose the cut-off of 0.7 as the value such that 10% of the firms had an interest cover below this
threshold in each year. This was done to ensure that the number of firms classified as being distressed
in each year was neither too large nor too small. In limited dependent variable models, such as the
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0 Decline in fixed assets (in current or next year), and
0 Decrease in share capital (in current or next year).
The base criteria is based on repayment capability, measured by interest cover10.
This relates to the notion that financial distress is associated with the condition that
operating profits cannot cover the total of fixed and sunk costs. However, a low inter-
est cover can result from capital accumulation financed by borrowings. In this case,
fixed assets in the firm should build up substantially. Similarly, while a low interest
cover may result from debt equity swaps, such retirement of share capital is very un-
likely to accompany simultaneous decline in fixed assets. Therefore, I designate a
firm as being financially distressed in a given year if all the above three conditions
are satisfied.11 Based on this measure, there were TZ[ instances of financial distress
in Z] RU[ firm years over the ST year period. The incidence of financial distress shows
substantial variation over the period of analysis (Table 2.1).
duration models used here, such an empirical strategy tends to generate the most robust empirical
results. As discussed before, the results here are robust to the choice of cut-off. In particular, the
results obtained with the traditional cut-off of 1.0 and an alternate cut-off of 0.5 is very similar.
10 Interest cover ratio is a ratio used to determine how easily a company can pay interest on outstand-
ing debt. The interest coverage ratio is calculated by dividing a company’s earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT) of one period by the company’s interest expenses of the same period:
Interest Cover Ratio= EBIT / Interest Expense
The lower the ratio, the more the company is burdened by debt expense. An interest coverage ratio
below 1 indicates the company is not generating sufficient revenues to satisfy interest expenses.
11 Admittedly, the cut-off for interest cover, as well as choice of periods is somewhat subjective.
Therefore, I verify that our findings are robust to alternate constructions of the synthetic measure.
Specifically, I consider alternative cut-offs at R\W and S\R, and three year windows centred on the
current year. My empirical results are robust to these investigations.
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TABLE 2.1: Financial Distress Incidence12
Year Distressed firms Total Incidence rate
S[[W-[X S TX U\ZW
S[[Y-[Z X YY Y\Y[
S[[[ SU UUV U\Z[
TRRR UR YTX V\SU
TRRS VR [U[ V\TX
TRRT U[ SRX[ U\XW
TRRU UT SSRY T\Z[
TRRV V[ STVX U\[U
TRRW WZ STUY V\X[
TRRX TS STYZ S\XV
Note. Measures of Financial Distress: interest cover ^ R\Y (in current or previ-
ous year), decline in fixed assets (in current or next year), and decrease in share
capital (in current or next year).
Sorce. Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database, Chinese nonfinancial listed firms.
Based on the above measure, I will estimate a regression model, describing
the hazard rate of financial distress as a function of macroeconomic, firm-specific
and industry factors, after conditioning on age of the firm since incorporation; See
Shumway (2001) for a related approach.
In terms of hazard model analysis, my age (duration) data are right-censored
and left-truncated.13 The Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database includes data on incor-
12 Once a firm has been defined as distressed based on the above criteria, it drops out of the sample
and is not included in computation of incidence rates for subsequent years.
13 For each company included in my sample, the data used pertain to years, since 1995, during which
the company is listed in either of Shanghai, Shenzen, Hong Kong or foreign stock exchanges. Hence,
for each company, the available data are left-truncated, and do not pertain to the entire period that it is
listed.
In statistics, censoring occurs when the value of a measurement or observation is only partially
known. Right-censored menas that a data point is above a certain value but it is unknown by how
much.
In statistics, truncation results in values that are limited above or below, resulting in a truncated
sample. A left-truncated sample can be thought of as being equivalent to an underlying sample with
all values less than the bound are entirely omitted.
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poration years for the included firms. However, these data are not entirely clean, and
display unrealistic lumping of entries in certain years. I verified and corrected the
incorporation years for the sample companies from other sources – stock exchanges
and company annual reports.
2.3.2 Macroeconomic conditions and instability
I use the following empirical proxies for macroeconomic conditions:
0 As a measure of the business cycle I use an index, the so-called “consistent
macro index” published by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
The index is derived from consistent indicators whose peak and trough
approximately coincide with that of per capita output at business cycle
frequencies. This measure is easily computed and regularly published, and
provides a reliable snapshot of the overall state of the economy. The index
of industrial production, number of industrial employees, growth rate of
completed investment in fixed assets, total retail sales of consumer goods, total
customs duties on imports and exports, revenue and total profits of industrial
enterprises, and the disposable income of urban residents are the indicators
included in the above index.
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0 Real interest rates are measured as the benchmark rate on 3-5 year RMB loans
for financial institutions (published by the People’s Bank of China),14 minus
the annual rate of inflation.
0 US business cycle, my proxy for export demand, is measured by the
Hodrick-Presscott filtered15 series of quarterly US GDP per capita16 averaged
over the four quarters of each year ( Published by U.S. Bureau of Economics
Analysis).
Figure 2.1 plots the annual incidence of financial distress and the business cy-
cle indicator for the year. Incidence is measured as the proportion (percentage) of
firms that were financially distressed (for the first time) that year to the total number
of listed companies. As expected, quoted firm financial distress is generally counter-
cyclical, being higher in recessions and lower during upturns of the business cycle.
However, the relationship between the two must be conditioned on other factors, both
microeconomic and macroeconomic, that are potentially important. Therefore, I also
14 Interest rates on commercial loans are directly linked to the benchmark rate. Between 1999 and
2003, lenders were allowed to set interest rates within a band between R\Y to S\U times the benchmark
rate of interest; the range was widened to R\[ times to S\Y times in January 2004, and the upper limit
was withdrawn in October 2004.
15 The goal of the HP filter is to serve as a means to seperate the cyclical component in output from
the growth component.
See "Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation", Hodrick & Prescott and "On
Adjusting The HP Filter For The Frequency Of Observations", Ravn & Uhlig (2002).
16 The index of the Chinese business cycle is derived from consistent indicators whose peak and
trough approximately coincide with that of GDP per capita at business cycle frequencies.
It is not conflict the fact that GDP measure is used in US business cycle, though I would have
preferred to use an index to measure cycle in US GDP but no such compitable official index was
available.
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include in my analysis real interest rates as well as measures of macroeconomic in-
stability.17
Business Cycle and Distress Incidence
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Figure2.1 Business Cycle and Distress Incidence
Note. Measures of Financial Distress: interest cover ^ R\Y (in current or previ-
ous year), decline in fixed assets (in current or next year), and decrease in share
capital (in current or next year).
Sorce. National Bureau of Statistics of China, macro economy index. Bureau
van Dijk’s Osiris database, Chinese nonfinancial listed firms.
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b) report an important role of macroeconomic sta-
bility on the survival of quoted UK and US firms, in addition to firm and industry
factors. It has been argued in the literature that macroeconomic instability may have
adverse effects on the performance of firms.
Further, the impact of such uncertainty is asymmetric. For example, in economies
with credit constraints, credit imperfections generate a transmission mechanism through
which a small, temporary shock can generate large, persistent domestic balance sheet
17 See also Koopman and Lucas (2005), Hackbarth et al. (2006) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b).
44
effects. This feature has motivated financial accelerator-type models (Bernanke et al.,
1996), including the borrowing constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), costly state
verification in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and sudden stops in Calvo (2003). The
amplification effect can explain why a small fundamental problem can evolve into
a large-scale deterioration of economic performance. The credit constraint interacts
with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle and generates asymmetric
effects in response to unexpected productivity shocks.18 There is related empirical
work on mechanisms which create asymmetric volatility responses (Engle and Ng,
1993); see Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b) for further discussion.
Traditional measures of instability, for example those based on standard devi-
ations, are not able to capture such asymmetric effects. I use signed gradients19 in
monthly measures of macroeconomic indicators to identify sharp changes. I use the
following measures of macroeconomic instability:
0 I measure interest rate instability by standard deviation of effective interest
rates (interest payments divided by total borrowings) across the cross-section
18 While a positive shock has only a small effect, a negative shock (even if temporary) can reduce
the value of the firm to a discounted liquidation value. Since the liquidated assets cannot be restored
when the shock is over, the amplification effect becomes persistent.
19 In vector calculus, the gradient of a scalar field is a vector field that points in the direction of the
greatest rate of increase of the scalar field, and whose magnitude is the greatest rate of change. The
use of gradient is to catch the sharp change during the certain time period.
The reason I use this measure is: (1) because the impact of interest rate uncertainty on firms’
distress is asymmetric, which means the traditional measure of instability such as those methods based
on standard deviations are not suitable on this situation. (2) While benchmark interest rates in China
show substantial volatility over the period of analysis, there are long periods over which there is little
variation in this measure.
So only use traditional standard deviation itself is not enough to identify this asymmetric effect
of interest rate uncertainty on firms’ distress. We need combine traditional standard deviation with
gradient measure together to give a proper indicator of interest rate instability.
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of firms in each year, signed by annual first differences of the cross-section
median. Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b) use, as their measure of interest rate
instability, the annual first differences of average short term real interest rates
prevailing during each year. While benchmark interest rates in China show
substantial volatility over the period of analysis, there are long periods over
which there is little variation in this measure. At the same time, cross-section
variation in effective interest rates is substantial, indicating that credit available
to firms are charged at variable interest rates. My measure captures this
variation, as well as potential asymmetric effects of interest rate instability.
0 Instability in exchange rate is measured by the largest month-to-month rate
of variation within the calendar year, based on monthly average real effective
exchange rates (published by the Bank for International Settlements).
2.3.3 Firm-level and industry-level characteristics
I include a number of variables characterising the firm and its financial performance,
and dummies to capture industry effects. Firm-level financial ratios are typically
strongly collinear with macroeconomic aggregates (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a,b).
This poses an empirical issue, not only because of potential endogeneity, but also
because my economic model presented later is based on the assumption that firm
level efficiency draws are independent of macroeconomic shocks. I regress size,
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cash flow, profitability and gearing at the firm-level on the macroeconomic variables
included in my analysis and collect residuals. These residuals, representing “excess”
values over what would be expected for the prevailing macroeconomic conditions
are used as measures of the firm-level factors. These computations are applied to the
following underlying measures of firm conditions.
0 Firm size is measured as the logarithm of fixed capital in real terms,
incremented by unity. Firm size is often an important determinant of a
firm’s competitive ability. Large firms are also likely to have less financing
constraints, which is reflected in the much higher failure rates of small firms
(Geroski and Gregg, 1996).
0 Profitability is measured by gross profit margin, which is calculated as the
ratio of gross profits to sales. It measures how much out of every unit of
sales a company actually keeps in earnings. Profit margin is useful when
comparing companies in similar industries. A higher profit margin indicates a
more profitable company that has better control over its costs compared to its
competitors.
0 I measure the firm’s financial structure by its gearing ratio, the ratio of debt
to the sum of debt and equity. This measure focuses on the claims of debt
investors and measures the extent to which the firm funds its capital employed
using debt. While financial leverage usually increases the returns on equity, it
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also increases the volatility of earnings. Companies with low gearing ratios
are reported to outperform the market in the long run (Taffler, 1982; Altman,
1993). A low debt to equity ratio is an attractive feature for investors as it is
indicative of lower financial risk and provides the firm with the opportunity to
raise more debt financing in the future.
0 Cash flow from operations is an important measure of the financial health of a
firm. Cash rich firms are potentially attractive takeover targets (Bhattacharjee
et al., 2009a,b). However, cash is also a relatively free financial resource with
potential for enhancing agency costs (Jensen, 1986).20 I include the ratio of
cash flow (CF) to capital (measured by total assets) in my analyses.
0 I also include a dummy for state ownership in my model. As discussed
earlier, Chinese state-owned firms and private firms are subject to different
competitive environments, and different financial and policy support when
they face the same macroeconomic shock. Therefore, their propensity for
financial distress may be different.
20 Theory suggests that cash may be wasted by managers on poor (low NPV) investments. In
the case of Chinese industry, this is particularly important, since prior research has suggested
overinvestment and overcapacity (Felipe et al., 2003), as well as misallocation of investment into
relatively unproductive sectors (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006).
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0 Dummies for stock exchanges21 – Shanghai, Shenzen and Hong Kong,
the benchmark being foreign listed firms, are included in my analysis to
capture potential institutional differences in corporate control and governance
mechanisms.
0 The theory and practice of industrial organisation highlights the role of
industry in firm dynamics, in terms of concentration, capital intensity,
innovation and various related factors. I collect data, from another external
source22, on the industry to which each of the sample firms belong, and use
industry dummies to control for systematic variation in financial distress
across different industries.
21 Both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) are relatively
young compared with foreign and HongKong Stock Exchange. They are respectively inauguration in
December 1990 and July 1991.
The main principle of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is to provide "Regulation, Innovation,
Cultivation and Service." For example, the Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SME Board) in
Shenzhen Stock Exchange is focused at expanding the growth of small and mid capital enterprises.
Unlike the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange is still not
entirely open to foreign investors due to tight capital account controls exercised by the Chinese
mainland authorities.
Though information efficiency of Shanghai stock market has improved a lot, it still indicates that
compared with developed stock markets like Hong Kong stock market, it is still less efficient given
the information spread process effect (Qu and Huan, 2008).
Because of its special relationship with mainland China, compared to other major financial centers
in the world, Hong Kong stock market is much more closely related to Chinese domestic stock
markets. Some leading Chinese companies are listed both in Hong Kong stock market and domestic
stock market. Despite the more stringent listing requirements for shares in HongKong, many
Chinsese companies, of which most are SOEs, still prefer to seek listing in the Hong Kong stock
exchange. This is due to the fact that the shares in the Hong Kong stock exchange are significantly
more liquid. Shares in Hongkong and Foreign stock exchanges are more attractive for investors as
well because of the larger degree of transparency provided by the companies (Seah et al., 2005).
22 China Center for Economics Research (CCER) Database, http://www.ccerdata.com.
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TABLE 2.2: Sample characteristics of the explanatory variables
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
FIRM # YEAR LEVEL
(Excess) size:
ln(real fixed capital + 1) Z] RU[ !R\RSSX S\UVT !Y\TYY X\YYZ
(Excess) Cash flow to Capital Z] RU[ !T\XV-V R\RXZ !R\VSW R\VRZ
(Excess) Gross Margin Z] RU[ R\RRTU R\URZ !U\RV[ U\RTR
(Excess) Gearing Z] RU[ S\WZ-W R\R[R !R\UTY R\W[X
MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Business Cycle ST [Z\VTZ T\YX [U\YU SRS\[U
Real interest rate ST X\XZY U\UT R\RW ST\TV
US Business Cycle ST R\VUS S\TR !S\SV T\ZT
MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY
Instability - Interest rate ST T\WUV R\WW S\YW V\RW
Instability - Exchange rate ST R\RVW R\SR !R\R[ R\SY
Sorce. Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database, Chinese nonfinancial listed firms.
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China macro economy index. Bank for
International Settlements, real exchange rate for Chinese Yuan. People’s Bank
of China, China interest rate and inflation rate. U.S. Bureau of Economics
Analysis, U.S. GDP data.
The sample characteristics of the firm-level and macroeconomic explanatory
factors included in my empirical model show substantial variation across firms in-
cluded in my sample, and over the period under study (Table 2.2). Further, there is
also substantial variation in the incidence of financial distress, as well as firm-level
explanatory variables, across different categories of ownership and stock exchanges
(Table 2.3). Specifically, despite higher median profitability, foreign firms show a
higher incidence of financial distress. Is this because of protection potentially of-
fered to state firms, or simply an outcome of lower cash flow and profitability for
some firms? Likewise, there is also large variation in distress incidence across the
stock exchanges. Can this be explained by variation in the institutional setting related
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to corporate governance, holding firm and macroeconomic factors constant? These
are questions that my empirical analysis will address, based on an economic model
developed in the next section.
TABLE 2.3: Distress and Firm level variables
by Ownership and Stock Exchange
Category Firm- Distress Firm # Year Level (median)
years Incidence Size CF/Cap. Margin Gearing
OWNERSHIP
Private T] RZT R\RV[W Y\WTW R\RW[R R\RYTX R\UVT
State W] Z[[ R\RUSV Z\SWR R\RXRS R\RXRX R\UUT
Collective WZ R\RSYT Y\XSR R\RZSY R\RYST R\TXX
EXCHANGE
Foreign YRZ R\RSWW Y\RWZ R\RYYR R\RYZS R\UVR
Hong Kong YRZ R\RTTX [\URU R\RZVZ R\R[WT R\USX
Shanghai U] YWW R\RUTW Z\RVT R\RWXW R\RXRR R\UUX
Shenzhen T] ZXZ R\RVZZ Y\[UR R\RWYX R\RW[U R\UUX
Sorce. Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database, Chinese nonfinancial listed firms.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Economic model
The economic model builds on the framework in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b), but accommodates the main special feature of Chinese
industry highlighted in this paper – that firms are shielded from exit by active state
protection. The low incidence of exits in Chinese industry points to higher sunk costs
relative to fixed costs (Owen and Ulph, 2002). This may also imply inadequate sec-
ondary markets where the firm can sell its assets in the event of exit. State protection
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in the form of an assured rate of return on assets, possibly at different rates for state
and private firms, can be viewed as a non-market mechanism to partly address this
problem.
Firms receive random effciency draws in each period, and in addition are af-
fected by macroeconomic shocks. Efficiency and macroeconomic shocks are inde-
pendent of each other, positively autocorrelated and evolve jointly as a first order
Markov process. My model implies that adverse macroeconomic conditions, in terms
of both the level of macroeconomic aggregates and instability, lead to more distressed
firms, and so too does poor random draws of firm-level efficiency.23 Further, I ac-
knowledge the potential effect of unobserved heterogeneity in founding conditions
and human capital (Thompson, 2005; Bhattacharjee et al., 2006).
At any time, , each firm, , is at risk of financial distress which depends both
on its level of efficiency and the macroeconomic conditions. The -th firm’s state
of technology (or efficiency) at time  is denoted by  and its capital by m. Firms
operate under a AK type production function which takes the form JKm . Here JK
is akin to the output-capital ratio and depends on firm efficiency: bJK_b ` R. I
assume that the dynamics in  and the economy wide macro-environment variable
 jointly follows a Markov transition process. I further assume that  and  are
positively autocorrelated and independent of each other. Hence,  and  are jointly
Markov, i.e.,
23 See Figure 1 in Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b).
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Evolution of capital occurs through investments z
m]MS _ JS ! /K m M z]
where / is the depreciation rate. Internal costs of adjustment, e Jm] zK, are homoge-
nous of degree 1 in m and z , so that
e Jm] zK _ m e
3
S]
z
m
4
_ meJK]
where  _ z_m is investment per unit of capital, and I assume that e is a differ-
entiable, increasing and convex function that is defined only for nonnegative , with
eJRK _ R.
Then, profits are given by
}JK ! eJK !  ! JKm]
where  denotes the cost of capital and JK is the firm specific impact of economic
shocks on profits. JK is increasing and convex in , and JRK _ R. Firms choose
their investment to maximise perpetual profit streams.
In line with evidence that exits are almost non-existent, I assume that there is
some mechanism (like state protection) which guarantees the firms a certain mini-
mum return on its capital; I denote this lower threshold by  (^ ). If the firm is
financially distressed, or in other words the value of its capital in the next period
x J$] $K falls below the required return on capital (), the residual value of the firm
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falls to the lower guaranteed threshold, . Then, given , the market value of the firm
per unit of capital under the optimal investment plan is:
xJ] K _ 
6R
JK ! eJK !  ! JK M JS ! / M Kx $ J] K]
where
x $ J] K _
S
-
| | 
x J
$] $K \S

x J
$] $K 6 

M\S

x J
$] $K ^ 

h J$] $] K
is the expected present value of capital in the next period given the firm’s  and the
economy’s  today, and - is the discount rate.24
At an interior maxima, the optimal  6 R satisfies the FOC
e RJK _ x $ J] K ! \
Now, since  and  are independent and positively autocorrelated, xJ] K
is increasing in  and decreasing in . For given macroeconomic condition  and
threshold return , I denote by J] K the threshold level of efficiency  at which the
firm becomes just financially distressed:
x
!
J] K] 
"
_ \
24 Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b) consider a similar model, where in each period a firm chooses between
continuation or selling its capital in the market for acquired capital. Here, in line with the Chinese
institutional setting, there is no exit, but incapacity to service its debt (or financial distress) drives the
rate of return on the firm’s assets to the floor, .
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Then, J] K D  and J] K E . When  is high, means fewer firm can reach
such high efficient level, more firms will be in financial distress. When  increase,
x will decrease, if we want to keep x equals to ,  have to increase. So J] K
increase with , means there will be more firms in financial distress( is high) when
macroeconomic conditions are unfavorable (  is high). If  increase, firms will get
higher guaranteed return, so the less financial pressure. J] K decrease with ,
so when there is higher threshold , fewer firms ( is low) will be in the financial
distress.
In other words, there is a larger pool of distressed firms whenever macroeco-
nomic conditions are unfavorable, and a smaller pool when the threshold return is
higher.
Therefore, testable implications of the the model are: (a) the hazard rate of fi-
nancial distress decreases with , (b) the hazard rate of distress is higher in adverse
macroeconomic conditions, and (c) microeconomic firm-level factors positively re-
lated to firm efficiency level affect the probability of financial distress negatively.
Further, in line with Bhattacharjee et al. (2006), there may be a role for unobserved
heterogeneity in the form of founding conditions and unobserved human capital.
2.4.2 Econometrics
I employ hazard regression models to study the impact of various explanatory factors
(covariates) on financial distress of Chinese firms. I allow the effect of age on the haz-
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ard rate of distress to be flexible, and include covariates (regressors) corresponding
to macroeconomic factors as well as firm and industry characteristics. Unobserved
heterogeneity in the form of entrepreneural human capital and founding conditions
also play a potentially important role.
Cox proportional hazards model
First, I estimate a Cox proportional hazards (PH) model (Cox, 1972), which is
the corner-stone for regression analysis of duration data. Initially, I do not allow for
unobserved heterogeneity. Consider a sample of size  from the population of newly
created firms. The conditional probability of financial distress at duration , given
the vector of explanatory variables , is measured by the hazard rate function JK.
For each firm , the data provides information on its life span  measured in years,25
the covariates JK, and also an indicator that the firm was not distressed by the end
of the period covered by the study. The latter information may be summarized by
defining a binary variable JK describing censoring as follows.
 _
<
R \ if firm  was not distressed over the study period 1995-2006
S \ if firm  was financially distressed at some point of time.
The continuous time Cox proportional hazards model is given by
J] -K _ RJK\ J
R-K] (2.1)
25  is the difference between the date of financial distress and the incorporation year for the -th
firm.
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where RJK is an unspecified function of  called the baseline hazard function and
- is a vector of the regression coefficients. Cox (1972, 1975) proposed estimation
based on maximising the partial likelihood function:
rn _
{
_S
T
XXV JR-Kr
_S
{ JR-K
U
YYW

]
where { _ S if  6  and { _ R if  ^ .26 The maximum partial likelihood
estimators - are obtained by maximising the logarithm of the above partial likelihood
function with respect to -. Since the distress times (durations) are grouped into years
since entry, there are a substantial number of ties. These ties are resolved using the
popular method proposed by Breslow (1974). The estimation exercise was carried
out using the STATA software.
I estimated two versions of the Cox PH model. In the first, a full set of year
dummies (fixed effects) were included to capture macroeconomic effects. In the sec-
ond, I model the macroeconomic effects explicitly by including measures of macro-
economic conditions and instability. These estimates are reported in the first two
columns of Table 4 respectively.
Discrete time proportional hazards model
26 The { ’s are a convenient method to exclude from the denominator the firms who have already
experienced financial distress and are thus not part of the risk set. In other words, the population
included in the denominator includes only the firms that had not been under financial distress before
. For censored firms the duration at distress is not observed, and therefore they do not contribute to
the probability of distress in the partial likelihood. This is why  _ R for such individuals.
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Next, I address the discrete (annual) nature of the duration data by considering
a grouped time version of the Cox proportional hazards model, also called the com-
plementary log-log model or discrete PH model (Cox, 1972; Prentice and Gloeckler,
1978)
 }!  S !  J] -K _ 
R- M . ] (2.2)
where the time intervals are indexed by  _ S] T] \ \ \ and  denotes the discrete
hazard rate in interval  (assumed constant over the interval). This discrete propor-
tional hazards model assumes that latent continuous failure times have a proportional
hazards specification but are grouped into intervals. Extending the typical implemen-
tation of this model assuming a constant baseline hazard rate, I capture time variation
in the baseline hazard function across periods by including the duration dummies . .
In other words, like the continuous time Cox proportional hazards model, I allow
the baseline hazard function to change with age of the firm. Specifically, I allow the
baseline hazard rate to vary over four time periods corresponding to the age intervals
0-3 years, 4-8 years, 9-23 years and “more than 23” years. This model was also es-
timated using the STATA software, and reported in the third set of results in Table
2.4.
Unobserved heterogeneity
As discussed before, there is potentially an important effect of unobserved het-
erogeneity on the hazard rate of financial distress. This can be partly attributed to
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unobserved factors affecting the hazard rate, such as entrepreneurial human capital
and founding conditions of firms.
I address this issue in two ways. First, I account for macroeconomic found-
ing conditions by estimating a shared frailty model, where a Gamma distributed un-
observed random factor is shared by all firms incorporated in the same year. The
effect of such heterogeneity turns out to be statistically insignificant, and therefore
these results are not reported. Second, I consider the grouped time proportional haz-
ards model (2.2) and assume Gamma distributed scalar unobserved random effects,
 JK, specific to each firm:
 }!  S !  J] -] K _ 
R
- M . M  JK ]  _ S] \ \ \ ] ]
 JK 9 i J.K ] (2.3)
where i J.K denotes the Gamma distribution with unit mean and shape para-
meter ..27 While the assumption of Gamma heterogeneity is to some extent arbitrary,
some asymptotic justification for the choice has been provided by Abbring and van
den Berg (2007). The model is estimated using the ‘pgmhaz8’ STATA code; see also
Jenkins (1995). Estimates of the model are reported in the final column of Table 2.4.
Nonproportional covariate effects
The proportional hazards and MPH models (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) substantially
restrict interdependence between the explanatory variables and duration. Specifi-
27 This is a special case of the mixed proportional hazards (MPH) model (van den Berg, 2001) with
discretely observed durations.
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cally, the restriction that coefficients of the regressors are constant over time may not
hold in many situations, or may even be unreasonable from the point of view of rel-
evant economic theory. In particular, the effect of a covariate on the hazard is often
empirically found to be increasing or decreasing in age (sometimes over the whole
covariate space, and sometimes over a range of the covariate space). This clearly
constitutes a violation of the proportional hazards assumption. Several tests for such
violation of the proportional hazards assumption are available in the literature; see,
for example, Grambsch and Therneau (1994) and Bhattacharjee (2008).
An appealing solution to such violation of proportionality is to allow the covari-
ate to have different effects on the hazard according to the age of the firm. Several
such estimators have also been proposed in the literature. In this paper, I used the
histogram-sieve estimators of Murphy and Sen (1991), which are intuitively appeal-
ing and permit useful inference. This method entails dividing the duration axis into
several intervals and including the covariate interacted with an indicator function cor-
responding to each interval as covariates in a modified hazard regression model; see
also Bhattacharjee (2004) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b).
2.5 Results and discussion
The model estimates are reported in Table 2.4. Overall, the estimates are in line with
a priori expectations, offering points of comparison with related studies for western
economies and leading to important policy conclusions.
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2.5.1 Model estimates
Results in the first column of Table 2.4 correspond to the continuous time Cox PH
model including a full set of year dummies, while the second set includes the mea-
sures of macroeconomic conditions and stability in place of the year fixed effects.
The two sets of results are very similar. I prefer the second, which is both parsi-
monious and facilitates understanding the effect of the macroeconomy on financial
distress.
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TABLE 2.4: Model Estimates28,29]30]31
Variables Cox PH Cox PH Disc.PH Disc.MPH
LOG BASELINE HAZARD
– Duration S ! ! !U\RV[T
J!R\UUK
!TR\WZW
J!S\YSK
M
– }Duration T ! Duration S ! ! X\TY[W
JT\SRK
$ Y\WSVV
JS\[UK
M
– }Duration U ! Duration S ! ! X\UTZW
JT\STK
$ Y\ZRT[
JT\RRK
$
– }Duration V ! Duration S ! ! X\WURT
JT\S[K
$ Z\S[RU
JT\SRK
$
INDUSTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
OWNERSHIP
(Base = Private) R R R R
State !R\RXXS
J!R\VZK
!R\RY[X
J!R\WYK
!R\R[ZY
J!R\X[K
!R\TXRZ
J!S\RTK
Collective !S\WX[T
J!R\[[K
!S\VZ[T
J!R\[XK
!T\ZSYV
J!T\WTK
$ !R\[[WX
J!R\XUK
STOCK EXCHANGE
(Base = Foreign exchanges) R R R R
Hong Kong R\XVVT
JS\WTK
R\YTTV
JS\YUK
M R\XYZX
JS\XWK
M S\WSVU
JT\TXK
$
Shanghai R\VWS[
JS\TXK
R\VYSR
JS\UVK
R\VSWV
JS\SYK
R\YVSU
JS\VTK
Shenzhen R\YRXX
JS\[VK
M R\YWYY
JT\STK
$ R\YUWX
JT\RZK
$ S\TTXV
JT\UUK
$
28 Sorce. Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database, Chinese nonfinancial listed firms. National Bureau of Statistics of China, China macro economy
index. Bank for International Settlements, real exchange rate for Chinese Yuan. People’s Bank of China, China interest rate and inflation rate.
U.S. Bureau of Economics Analysis, U.S. GDP data.
29 -scores in parentheses; $$ , $and M– significant at SG, WG and SRG level respectively.
30 Durations 1–4 refer to the age intervals 0-3, 4-8, 9-23 and “` 23” years respectively.
31 Test for proportionality of hazards is rejected at the WG level against a monotone hazard ratio alternative, for the macroeconomic variables
interest rate instability and US business cycle, both for the Cox PH and Discrete PH model specifications. I therefore allow the effect of these
variables to vary with age of the firm. For further details on the methodology, see Bhattacharjee (2008).
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TABLE 4: Model Estimates (Contd.)
Variables Cox PH Cox PH Disc.PH Disc.MPH
FIRM # YEAR LEVEL
(Excess) size:
ln(real fixed capital + 1) !R\RXUX
J!S\RTK
!R\RYVW
J!S\SZK
!R\R[TS
J!S\XWK
M !R\T[VR
J!T\XTK
$$
(Excess) Cash flow to Capital !ST\USV
J!SV\XTK
$$ !ST\S[[
J!SV\XRK
$$ !ST\[XV
J!SZ\RRK
$$ !UR\WUX
J!ST\TWK
$$
(Excess) Gross Margin R\STYU
JR\[XK
R\R[XR
JR\YUK
R\RTSZ
JR\SZK
!R\USWV
J!S\SYK
(Excess) Gearing R\RSTU
JR\RTK
!R\R[XU
J!R\SWK
!R\S[[X
J!R\T[K
U\ZVY[
JT\YUK
$$
MACROECONOMY
Year dummies YES NO NO NO
Business Cycle ! !R\SU[X
J!S\VYK
!R\RZWT
J!R\[VK
!R\RSXR
J!R\XXK
Real interest rate ! !R\R[XY
J!R\YYK
!R\RTWV
J!R\TSK
R\RYWV
JR\WSK
Interest rate instability
# I(age 0-3 years) ! S\[URY
JT\ZZK
$$ S\ZWXY
JT\S[K
$ T\TUYY
JS\[XK
$
# I(age ` 3 years) ! R\VTTX
JR\ZUK
R\S[XU
JR\VRK
!R\TYSS
J!R\VXK
Exchange rate instability ! R\XTTY
JR\W[K
!R\[RVV
J!R\[WK
S\SRSS
JR\ZSK
US Business Cycle
# I(age 0-3 years) ! R\VUYZ
JR\XXK
R\VSUY
JR\XUK
!R\ZUUT
J!S\RXK
# I(age ` 3 years) ! R\SSRR
JS\SWK
R\SRWY
JS\SUK
R\RRTX
JR\RTK
No. of firms (No. in distress) S] XR[JTZ[K S] XR[JTZ[K S] XR[JTZ[K S] XR[JTZ[K
Total time at risk (firm-yrs) Z] RU[ Z] RU[ Z] RU[ Z] RU[
Log-likelihood !SSXZ\VTW !SSYT\XX[ !ZVU\ZTT !YXV\TWU
LRT – Joint significance of
industry dummies (d.f. / -value) SX_R\VVZ SX_R\RRR$$ SX_R\RRZ$$ SX_R\TRT
LRT – Joint significance of macro.
variables (d.f./-value) [_R\RRW$$ Y_R\RUU$ Y_R\RXSM Y_R\UYS
The Grambsch and Therneau (1994) test fails to reject the proportional hazards
assumption for both models. However, the Bhattacharjee (2008) test rejects propor-
tionality against monotone nonproportional covariate effects for two variables: inter-
est rate instability and the US business cycle. Therefore, I allow these covariates to
63
have potentially age varying effects, using the histogram sieve estimator of Murphy
and Sen (1991).
I also estimate a model with shared frailty, where firms incorporated in the same
year are clustered a priori to have the same draw of a Gamma distributed random ef-
fect. Estimates are similar, but evidence for unobserved heterogeneity in macroeco-
nomic founding conditions is not significant. Nevertheless, I suspect a potential role
for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, possibly related to unobserved entre-
preneurial human capital, initial efficiency level, or other endowments (Bhattacharjee
et al., 2006).
Further, since my duration data are recorded in annual frequency, the data gen-
erating process is better modeled as a grouped duration data proportional hazards
model, or discrete PH model. As discussed above, I incorporate an useful variation
and allow the baseline hazard function to vary over the lifetime of the firm.32 Model
estimates, presented in the third set of results in Table 2.4 are similar to the continu-
ous time Cox PH model.
Finally, I estimate the model in discrete time, after accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual firm level. Estimates with Gamma distributed hetero-
geneity allowing for nonproportional covariate effects are presented in the final set
of results in Table 2.4.33 The null hypothesis of “no unobserved heterogeneity” is re-
32 Specifically, the baseline hazard function is allowed to take different values over the four age
intervals: 0-3 years, 4-8 years, 9-23 years and “more than 23” years respectively.
33 I also estimated a similar model with unobserved heteogeneity modeled nonparametrically as a
discrete mixture of degenerate distributions in a sequence with increasing number of components; for
further discussion of this methodology, see Jenkins (1995) and van den Berg (2001). I do not find
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jected at the S percent level. While the estimates are similar to the previous models
in signs of the coefficients, magnitude and significance of the covariate effects are
somewhat different. Further, the effect of interest rate instability clearly varies with
age of the firm.34
I check my results for robustness in several ways. First, in allowing for unob-
served heterogeneity at the firm level, I verify that my findings are robust to ignored
firm specific factors. Second, as discussed earlier, I experiment with several alterna-
tive constructions of my measure of financial distress; the estimates are very similar,
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Third, I estimate a logit model with firm level
fixed effects and verify the my findings are consistent.
Overall, my empirical results underscore the importance of allowing for unob-
served heterogeneity and nonproportional covariate effects.
Firm attributes and industry
My findings on the impact of firm level factors on the hazard rate of financial
distress fall along expected lines. Further, these effects are strong and robust to the
impact of firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
The hazard rate of financial distress declines significantly with size. With grad-
ual liberalisation of the Chinese industrial sector, goals of firms have progressively
evidence of such discrete mixture frailty.
34 As discussed earlier, I statistically test the hypothesis that each of the covariates included in the
analysis has proportional effects on the hazard rate of financial distress. The tests proposed in Bhat-
tacharjee (2008) used for this purpose indicate that two of the included covariates, namely interest rate
instability and the US business cycle, have nonproportional effects. I therefore interact the effect of
these two explanatory variables with firm age.
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concentrated on profit maximization. As a consequence, more resources have con-
centrated on the large enterprises and departments, and small SOEs and private en-
terprises have faced increasing financial difficulties. Concurrently, through its reform
of the SOE sector, the state has also concentrated its supportive role on the big state-
owned companies.
As expected, financial distress increases with gearing; companies with lower
gearing have a more sustainable debt profile and are therefore less susceptible to
financial distress. While the effect of profitability on financial distress is not signif-
icant, companies with higher cash flow have lower hazard of financial distress. This
finding is consistent with the idea that the financial strength gained from a stronger
cash flow dominates potential agency costs related to free cash flow.
The age of firms significantly affects financial distress in the discrete time mod-
els. The baseline hazard rate for firms over 8 years of age is significantly higher than
the youngest firms below 3 years of age. This evidence is somewhat unexpected.
Nevertheless, the finding is not inconsistent with the active learning model (see also
Pakes and Ericson, 1998), and may reflect special protection offered to very young
firms, specially in strategic industries.
However, the industry fixed effects are jointly significant at the W percent level
only in the estimated discrete PH model without frailty. This evidence is in line with
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the idea that lack of an appropriate competitive business environment may inhibit
development of strong industry effects.35
Macroeconomic conditions and instability
The annual fixed effects representing macroeconomic conditions (not reported
in Table 2.4) show evidence of a sharp decline over the period 1998 to 2006. This
provides evidence that the operating environment for Chinese firms has improved
over time, notwithstanding significant macroeconomic fluctuations. Although none
of these year effects are individually significant at the W percent level, they are jointly
significant at the S percent confidence level. Since the period under study covers
various stages of the business cycle, the above evidence points to the important role
of macroeconomic management for Chinese industry.
Overall, my findings point to the impact of macroeconomic instability on en-
hanced financial distress. In fact, the only prominent macroeconomic effects are ob-
served for interest rate instability. Further, this adverse effect depends on the age of
firms since listing, being statistically significant only for the youngest firms. Young
firms, primarily private firms, suffer from greater credit constraints compared to state
firms. Even otherwise, the adverse effect of macroeconomic shocks may be greater
on younger firms, because of learning and other related effects (Bhattacharjee et al.,
2009b). This underscores the nonproportional effect of interest rate instability and
justifies my empirical strategy to allow for age varying covariate effects.
35 Evidence from India (Bhattacharjee and Majumdar, 2007) suggests that industrial reforms have
enhanced the role of industry in determining inter-firm profitability differentials.
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There is also limited evidence that Chinese firms are likely to face higher fi-
nancial distress during years when the Yuan Renminbi (RMB) appreciates sharply.
However, this effect is significant either when interest rate instability is not included
in the model, or when high exchange rate instability is interacted with concurrently
high interest rate instability. This can be partly explained by the link between the
fixed exchange rate regime and lower flexibility in interest rate setting in the Chinese
macroeconomy.36
The business cycle is not significant and neither is the US business cycle, my
proxy for export demand. Similarly real interest rates also have no significant effect.
The general lack of significant effects of macroeconomic conditions, rather than in-
stability, on financial distress appears to underscore relatively robust macroeconomic
management. Weaker firms may be offered protection against adverse macroeco-
nomic shocks, and despite the export orientedness, it would appear that Chinese in-
dustry has been by and large successful in finding alternative export markets and
thereby avoiding strong adverse effects of external shocks. At the same time, state
interventionism may be negatively associated with growth and productivity (Guar-
iglia and Poncet, 2008).
Institutional influences
The most important institutional influences coming out of my results lie in the
consistent and significant effect of stock exchanges. In particular, as compared with
36 Contrary to claims by the Chinese monetary authority of a managed floating exchange rate policy,
the Dollar/RMB exchange rate had been stable around Z\TY over the 11 year period 1994 to 2005. The
constraints of fixed exchange rate is strongly reflected in China’s interest rate policy over this period.
68
foreign stock exchanges, firms listed in domestic exchanges have higher distress haz-
ard, and the effect is particularly high for Hong Kong and Shenzhen exchanges. Pre-
vious research has highlighted several structural and institutional differences across
Chinese stock exchanges; see, for example, Mookherjee and Yu (1995). In particular,
it has been noted that Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges suffer from poor le-
gal infrastructure, as well as inefficiencies (Li, 2003). My evidence appears to point
towards an important disciplining role played by stock exchanges, particularly Hong
Kong and Shanghai.
As discussed earlier, the fact that state protection for the failing firm is substan-
tial in China. Against this backdrop, one would expect state owned and collective
firms to have a lower hazard of financial distress. Somewhat surprisingly, while there
is a consistent negative effect, this is not statistically significant. One explanation
could be interaction with size, since most of the SOEs are very large. Indeed, when
size is not included in the model, ownership turns out to be significant. However, this
is a tentative suggestion which requires to be examined further.
2.5.2 Comparison with advanced economy studies
My study highlights several important similarities and differences with advanced
economy studies on the determinants of firm exits, defaults and distress, such as
those reported in Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b).
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First, I highlight the fact that there are indeed very few exits in Chinese indus-
try. This primarily points to very weak debtor protection, an institutional setting that
the economic model developed here fits very well. A new bankruptcy code has re-
cently been introduced, and its impact on ensuring appropriate and progressive legal
infrastructure for reorganisation and bankruptcy remains to be seen; see Falke (2007)
for a discussion of the code and its likely implications. Also, it is evident that sub-
stantial state protection is offered to weak firms, but also some private firms. Such
interventionist industrial policy appears to be effective, somewhat in the same way as
Chapter 11 in the US partially protects firms from immediate dissolution (Brouwer,
2004; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a). However, notwithstanding limited positive influ-
ences, lack of disciplining influence of debtors, and potentially stock markets too, is
likely to encourage inefficiency in Chinese industry; see also Guariglia and Poncet
(2008).
Second, in terms of microeconomic firm-level factors, my results are very sim-
ilar to western studies, in that size, cash flow and gearing are found to be important
determinants of financial distress.
Third, my results point to a substantially lower effect of industry as compared
to western studies such as Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b). This may not be very sur-
prising. Evidence from India (Bhattacharjee and Majumdar, 2007) points to the fact
that it often takes an intensive period of industrial reforms for western type industry
structure to develop.
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Fourth, and perhaps most surprisingly, I find much weaker macroeconomic
effects as compared with western studies on firm exit (Ilmakunnas and Topi, 1999;
Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a,b). The main explanations rest in active state protection
of weak firms and credible macroeconomic management. In this context, particularly
important is my finding that the US business cycle also has no substantial effect, in
spite of a high dependence on exports; this evidence is in sharp contrast with listed
firms in the UK (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a,b). It appears that Chinese industry is
very effective in locating demand for its exports overseas.
Finally, my observation of an increasing baseline hazard rate is somewhat un-
usual, though not inconsistent with the active learning model; see Pakes and Ericson
(1998), for example. Institutional explanations can be potentially found in the nature
of Chinese state protection, an issue for future study.
2.5.3 Policy implications
Several important policy implications emerge from our analysis, particularly against
the context of ongoing transition in the Chinese economy.
First, interest rate instability, measured by cross-section variation in effective
interest rates, have a devastating effect on the youngest firms. As discussed earlier,
credit constraints in Chinese industry are very high (Huang and Khanna, 2003) and
presumably this affects the youngest firms hardest. This points to the need for devel-
opment of appropriate markets. Similarly, though relatively weaker, exchange rate
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instability also has some detrimental effect on Chinese firms. Here too, further lib-
eralisation of foreign exchange markets (particularly in derivatives products) may
provide better opportunity for Chinese firms to guard against exchange rate shocks.
Second, active state protection for the failing firm is likely to diminish with
the implementation of new laws and reorganisation systems (Harmer, 1996; Falke,
2007). This will potentially make Chinese firms more susceptible to macroeconomic
shocks in the future. The importance of good macroeconomic management will then
be even more enhanced. In particular, as evident from the increasing baseline hazard
rate, an important positive aspect of the current institutional setting appears to be
strong protection offered to weaker (younger) firms. While such state protection
may reduce through legal reform, adequate provisions need to be built into the new
legislation. Chapter 11 in the US offers similar protection to firms while upholding
debtor rights too (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a). The legislation and practice of Chapter
11 may thus serve as an important model for Chinese bankruptcy and reorganisation
laws.
Finally, China has so far followed a rather gradualist approach to reforms in
industrial policy. My evidence shows that the kind of industry effects typical in
advanced economies are yet to emerge. “Command and control” industrial policies
in many developing countries inhibit the development of typical industry structures
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one finds in advanced economies. Further reform of the industry sector will possibly
promote the emergence of more prominent industry effects.37
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the relationship between financial distress on the one hand,
and firm-level characteristics and the macroeconomic cycle on the other, focusing on
listed Chinese companies. The period of analysis, 1995-2006, has seen massive reg-
ulatory and institutional changes in China, and evidenced substantial variation in the
business cycle and instability. State protection in China ensures that there are only
very few business exits. Therefore, I conduct my analysis based on a synthetic mea-
sure of financial distress. Conditioned on the above institutional setting, I develop a
simple economic model of financial distress. Using hazard regression analysis, I find
important effects of firm-level characteristics such as age of the firm, size, gearing
and cash flow. In addition, I find an important effect of instability in the interest rate,
as well as important institutional effects. The results are robust to unobserved hetero-
geneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar macroeconomic
founding conditions.
My results underscore the importance of smooth macroeconomic management
in an emerging market context. Further, they offer interesting points of comparison
37 The Indian experience, studied in Bhattacharjee and Majumdar (2007), indicate that the role of
industry in determining firm performance emerges a reasonable time after active industrial policies
are implemented.
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with related studies in western economies, and highlight several policy implications.
In particular, the important role for developing appropriate markets is emphasized,
and so too are reforms in industrial policy and the rule of law.
Several lines of further research emerge from this work. First, the links be-
tween the process of macroeconomic, industrial and legislative reforms in China and
corporate distress hypothesized in this paper need to be further examined. Second,
the finding of a decreasing baseline hazard rate is unusual in the literature. Robust-
ness of this finding needs to be studied and explanations sought in the specifics of
industrial dynamics in China. Third, implications of my work for credit scoring, and
more generally credit management under the Basel II framework, require further ex-
amination. Finally, while I identify new evidence on the determinants of financial
distress in Chinese industry, similar work for other emerging market economies is
required for obtaining a more precise understanding of these issues.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Study of R&D Investment and
Efficiency of Chinese Firms
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this Chapter has been to investigate the determinants of both the level
of R&D spending and the efficiency of this spending – the amount of innovative
progress made in relation to the level of R&D spending - for a sample of large and
medium size Chinese industrial enterprises from different ownership sectors during
2000-2007.
It is well known that R&D has become increasingly important not only for in-
dividual firm’s survival and growth, but also the development of the whole economy.
Ownership structure and its concentration have important role in the firm’s strategy
of R&D investment (Leech, 1991), due to it representing a source of power that can
either support or oppose manager’s long- or short-term orientation (Salancik, 1980;
Hill and Snell, 1989). With China still being in transition from its central planning
legacy, Chinese government might be anticipated to play an active role in financing
and directing R&D. R&D efficiency and R&D expenditure could be potential chan-
nels through which the ownership effect on productivity is transmitted.
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The ownership structure has become more diversified since China started its
economic reform from 1979– state owned enterprises(SOEs), collective owned en-
terprises, privates owned enterprises and joint ventures. There is a distinct hierarchy
of financial and technical capabilities among these different types of firms (Goodhart,
1996; Zhang et al., 2003; Guariglia and Poncet, 2008).
Under central planning system, State sector was the heart of China socialist
economy and dominated the economy in all the key aspects. They had benefited for
decades from preferential allocations of funds, equipment, foreign exchange, univer-
sity graduates, skilled labor, and scarce materials. (Jefferson and Xu, 1991).
Chinese SOEs appear to behave significantly different from other local-owned
firms with respect to imitation, innovation and competition (Child, 1994; Pan and
Parker, 1997). SOEs are privileged access to resources to fiscal subsidies, notably
financial capital from state banks, and have been encouraged by government to im-
prove their technological capacity (Qian and Roland, 1996; Coady and Wang, 2000;
Bruun and Bennett, 2002). As compared to their own past, state owned enterprises
(SOEs) performance has improved in terms of increased productivity (Chen et al.,
1988; Groves et al., 1994); on the other hand, as compared to firms of joint ventures,
private enterprises, and township-village enterprises (TVEs), SOEs clearly lagged in
economic efficiency (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994; Woo et al., 1993).
Being outsiders to the traditional system, non-state enterprises have to obtain
credits and inputs from competitive markets, and in turn, their products are sold
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to markets. They face hard budget constraints, and they would not survive if their
performances were poor. Productivity in China’s non-state sector grew more than
twice as fast as in the state sector between 1980 and 1992 (Jefferson and Rawski,
1994). However most of non-state firms are still relatively small compared to large
and medium sized SOEs and their ability to invest in R&D is limited (Lin et al.1998).
With state subsidies, protection, and easy access to bank debts, SOEs face
smaller bankruptcy pressure than other ownership type firms. SOEs might take high
risk R&D investment which is greater than the firms’s affordability. Lack of operation
monitor and soft budget constraint, the efficiency performance of R&D investment in
SOEs sector does not look very optimistic. Heavily relying on the state for survival
and development will also become a heavy burden to public finance and endanger the
bank system (Zhang, 2004; Aziz, 2008).
While there have been a number of studies examine the impact of ownership
type on productive efficiency in developed economy, empirical analysis of ownership
impact on firm R&D performance in transition economy is relatively rare (Zhang et
al. 2003; Qian and Xu, 1998; Huang and Xu 1998; Goel, 1999; Frydman et al.,
1999; Zhang et al., 2001). This chapter contributes to the empirical research of R&D
efficiency of firms under various forms of ownership in transition economy.
Before I use inferential statistics to draw the main conclusions, I provide the
simple summaries about the data by using basic descriptive statistics measures, to-
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gether with simple graphics illustrations. A variety of evidence indicates that reform
has substantially accelerated innovation in China’s enterprises.
Using R&D investment regression model and production frontier function, I
test the R&D investment and efficiency of medium and large Chinese industrial firms
and found that the presence of state ownership is positively related with R&D invest-
ment, but negatively related to R&D performance. Foreign firms are technical leader
in Chinese industries and have advantage in R&D efficiency.
These points out the fact that while the firms possessing more innovation re-
sources and government support – the state-owned enterprises – undertake more
R&D, they are not the ones performing better technically. Empirical results also
show significant cross industries differences in R&D investment and output.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains review of the relevant
literatures and background and revolution of ownership structure in Chinese indus-
tries. Data and descriptive statistics results are presented in Section 3. In section 4,
empirical procedure and results are presented. I conclude the paper in Section 5.
3.2 Literature review and institutional backdrop
In this section, I would like to provide a concise picture of background and revolution
of ownership structure in China first and then investigate the influence of ownership
on firms’ R&D behavior from existing research.
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3.2.1 Ownership reform in China
Under central planning system, state sector was the heart of China socialist economy
and dominated the economy in all the key aspects, including resource, production,
employment. State owned enterprises (SOEs)38 are the provider of variety social
welfare, such as medical insurance, housing. In order to improve Chinese industry
efficiency without changing the nature of socialist economy and the leading role of
the state, ownership reform was implemented gradually.
At the early stage of China reform, in order to clarify the rights and responsi-
bility of enterprises, contract responsibility system was introduced to SOEs. SOEs
were allowed to maintain certain percentage of their residual income, which helps
improve the autonomy and address the problems with incentives. Profitability and
cost of investment have become the most important factors to be considered by firms
in their short-run and long-run production plans. In a study of the emerging manage-
rial market in China, Groves et al. (1995) examine the incentives of SOE managers
and find that managerial compensation is more closely linked to firm profit after the
reform.
The scope of restructuring was gradually enlarged, Chinese communist party
still maintained the ultimate control authority of personnel selection and dismissal
and when the business went under pressure, the state absorbed any financial losses.
With the evolution of economic reform, government found it becoming more and
38 In order to emphasize the impact of different ownerships on R&D of firms, SOEs here represents
firms purely owned by state.
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more difficult to subsidize SOEs simply by budgetary resources or designated policy
loans, especially when a tight monetary policy was adopted.
As a means to improve the ability of SOEs to raise funds independently and
subject SOEs to market discipline, the stock market was developed by the Chinese
government and SOEs had been encouraged to restructured into joint stock and share-
holding companies during 1990s. Industries and enterprises were allowed to practice
shareholding system and certain degree of shares were allowed to transfer to private
and foreign investors. But it was strictly regulated by the policy statements and le-
gal documents. The large SOEs were corporatized into ‘national enterprises groups’,
which helped the state control the production output from key industrial sectors, such
as heavy machinery, steel and iron, energy, telecommunication, metal, automobile,
airplane, space and finance, and therefore, they helped the state fulfill its macro eco-
nomic policies.
In the meanwhile, spectacular expansion of non-state sector had attracted the
notice of policy makers and economists.
With poor legal and financial system, the private sector grows much faster than
the state and listed sectors, and provides most of the economy’s growth (Allen et
al., 2005). In 1980 contribution of Private Sector firms was almost negligible, but in
2008 it was 27% of total industrial output. Even some of the small loss-making SOEs
from non-key industries were sold to the private owners when policy of ‘seizing on
the big and letting go the small’ was implemented in 1990s. Private sector had been
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becoming an important source for employment opportunities, with total employees
numbering at 79 million in 2008. As part of China’s open policy, first appeared in
special economic zones, foreign and joint venture capital had become inseparable
part of Chinese economy. China had become the one of the biggest FDI recipient
and received $90 billion in 2009.39
The aim of China’s ownership reform is to enhance the role of the market and
competition without changing the nature of the socialist economy (Bell et al., 1993).
Although the ownership system has become more diversified, the state remains in
control of most of the resources and basic industries. The essential features of their
governance structure (soft budget constraint, government intervention, and the em-
ployment relationship) have remained intact (Dong and Putterman, 2003).
3.2.2 Literature review
Previous studies of influence of ownership structure on productivity differences be-
tween firms focused on controls, incentives and agency costs.
Ownership can play important role in the firm’s strategy of R&D investment
due to it represents a source of power that can either support or oppose manager’s
long- or short-term orientation. Expectations of investors, their concern with stock
prices, and their holding periods can affect R&D investment. (Baysinger et al., 1991).
Hill and Snell (1989) theorize that ownership structure affects productivity both
directly and indirectly through the mediators of diversification strategy, R&D expen-
39 National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistics Year Book 2009.
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diture, and capital intensity. This result which is based on data from a cross-sectional
set of 122 Fortune 500 firms suggests that ownership affects a firm’s posture toward
diversification and investment in R&D. Those factors and capital intensity in turn
explain differences in productivity between firms.
Leech and Leahy (1991) give empirical support to the theory that the owner-
ship structure and its level of concentration have an important role in the growth of
the company by studying data from British companies. They describe ownership
structure in terms of both control and incentive factors. They explain that structure
of share ownership may have an important role in determining a firm’s performance
because if ownership is widely dispersed there is no individual (or group) with either
the voting power or the incentive to exercise control and enforce profit maximiza-
tion. The behavior and performance of the firm are affected by managerial discretion
to pursue other goals.
Zhang et al. (2003) find state sector has lower R&D efficiency than do the
non-state sectors. Ownership type should affect the R&D efficiency of firms because
managerial incentives, project screening mechanisms, project financing methods, and
the hardness of the budget constraint may be different across ownership sectors. For
example, Huang and Xu (1998) explain that centralized economies make R&D inef-
ficient due to lack of competitive financing sources with effective monitoring mech-
anisms. As a result of soft budget constraint, state enterprises lack the commitment
to stop bad R&D projects through effective ex-post screening mechanisms. The case
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of state owned enterprises (SOEs) requires special attention because SOEs are the
least likely of firms in the ownership types to be profit maximizers. Bai et al. (2000)
argue that, because SOEs play an important role both in providing a wide range of
social services to employees and their families and in maintaining social stability, the
managers of SOEs may be biased toward increasing output rather than maximizing
profit.
Much research has been done to test the different innovation performance of in-
digenous and foreign-owned plants. Griffith et al. (2002) find foreign owned multi-
nationals are frequently technological leaders within UK industries and that tech-
nology transfer from these technological leaders makes a substantial contribution to
productivity growth in domestic-owned establishments. Similarly, Love et al. (1996)
analyze a sample of manufacturing plants located in Scotland with the conclusion
that foreign ownership has positive effect on the likelihood of innovation.
These conclusions raise several issues about the reasons for the productivity
advantage of foreign firms and the effects of their presences in the domestic market.
Griffith et al. (2002) believe that it is typically more costly for firms to operate
abroad than domestically. Local firms have superior knowledge of local market, con-
sumer preferences and business practices. Foreign firms must therefore have some
other advantages over domestic firms in order to compete. This can be in the form
of higher productivity level, or through greater market power, for example through
owning a patent. They suggest that there are several mechanisms by which inward
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foreign investment can affect either the level or growth rate of domestic productiv-
ity. First, foreign firms may introduce new technologies into the domestic market.
Demonstration effect means that domestic firms may be able to imitate the technol-
ogy used by foreign firms more easily once the foreign firm is located in the domes-
tic market. Second, foreign firms may increase competitive pressure in the domestic
product market and may broaden the market by opening up access to foreign market.
However, Love et al. (1996) provide the empirical evidence that market power
and variations in industrial structure have no discernible effect on innovation, instead
plant size and the presence of in-plant R&D have positive effect on the likelihood of
innovation. Further, they find some clues by the postal questionnaire that small in-
digenous companies are more likely to cite finance as a barrier, and rely on support for
innovation by government agencies and the relevant authorities. By contrast, foreign
owned firms are much more likely to rely on internal support networks and sources
of finance are less likely to be seen as barriers to innovation. They finally suggest
the tentative conclusion that the financial, technical and managerial infrastructure on
which large, external multinational companies can draw is an important aspect of the
innovation process, which cannot be easily reproduced by their smaller, indigenous
counterparts.
84
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The test data is derived from the Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial
Enterprises 2000-2007, which record R&D data for large and medium size industrial
enterprises, published by China’s National Bureau of Statistics and National Devel-
opment of Reform Commission. This resource divided by the firm size, ownership
type, industries, contains information including basic economics activities, R&D per-
sonnel, R&D funding raise, R&D expenditure, R&D activities, new products inno-
vation and production, patents, etc.
For 2000-2004: This data source includes panel data for ownership and indus-
try, separately. And for 2005-2007, panel data for ownership industry is contained.
Large and medium size means that a firm satisfies the following standards:
employment is more than 300, sales revenue is more than 30 million Yuan and assets
value is more than 4 million Yuan.
Since I use Cobb-Douglas type production funtion that requires log transfor-
mations, I combine small sectors together, so that no oberservation has zero R&D
input.
Before I use inferential statistics to draw the main conclusion, I would like
to provide simple summary about the data by using basic descriptive statistical mea-
sures, together with simple graphic illustrations. First, I present the overview of R&D
activities and performances of entire large and medium enterprises. Then, I describe
the R&D activities across different ownership sectors and different industries.
85
3.3.1 Overview of R&D activities in entire large and medium
enterprises
R&D activities have dramatically increased in Chinese industry over the last decade,
judged by both R&D input and output measures. While R&D personnel and capital
investment are chosen to explain R&D input, new products and patents output have
been chosen as R&D output measures.
Both quantity and quality of R&D personnel
Human resource plays key role in innovation. It is important for firms to have
certain scale and high quality of the research team. It can be seen from figure 3.1,
being stable during 2000-2004, Total R&D personnel of Chinese large and medium
industrial enterprises maintains a rapid growth trend after 2004, reaching 2.5 mil-
lion people in 2008, with an increase of 12.1% compared to 2007. The number of
scientists and engineers of Chinese large and medium industrial enterprises has sig-
nificantly increased as well, reaching 1.6 million in 2008, up 13.4% than 2007.
The percentage of R&D personnel on total labor and Scientists and Engineer
on total labor decreased significantly from 2002 to 2004. Though they started to
increase gradually after 2004, still have not recovered to the level before 2004. This
result shows that Chinese large and medium industrial enterprises are still lack of
quality labors. This could be an obstacle for Chinese firms to carry out technical
innovation activities.
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Figure 3.1 Large&Medium Size Industrial Enterprises R&D
Personnel(1000)
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Figure 3.2 Large&Medium Size Industrial Enterprises R&D
Personnel(% of Total Labor)
Note. R & D personnel refer to the number of persons of enterprises directly
engage or participate in R&D activities in the reporting year, including partici-
pation in R&D project, R&D management, R&D direct service. Scientists and
Engineers refer to among R&D personnel who have high, intermediate techni-
cal titles (positions) or who have undergraduate or above degrees.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology
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of China, China Statistics Yearbook on Science and Technology 2000-2008.
R&D investment continues to increase, enhance the independent innova-
tion ability
Judged from R&D investment indicators (R&D funding raise and R&D inner
expenditure) in figure 3.3, 2004-2008, R&D investment of Chinese large and medium
industrial enterprises continues its rapid growth in large and medium industrial en-
terprises. In 2008, R&D funding raise in large and medium industrial enterprises
totalled 522.04 billion Yuan, up 21.1% compared with 2007. In 2008, R&D inner
expenditure amounted to 504.07 billion Yuan, up 22.2% compared with 2007.
Ratio of R&D expenditure on sales is an indicator that reflects innovation in-
tensity in figure 3.4. This ratio had experienced decrease from 2000 to 2003 and
remained in low level afterwards.
Inadequate funding for science and technology will weaken the ability of en-
terprises to innovate, thus affecting future growth to some extent.
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Figure 3.3 Large&Medium Size Industrial Enterprises R&D
Expenditure(Billion Yuan)
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Figure 3.4 Large&Medium Size Industrial Enterprises R&D
Expenditure(% of Sales Revenue)
Note. R&D Inner Expenditure refers to R&D expenditure within the enterprise
in the reporting year, including cost of personnel, raw material, equipment and
other. This term does not include R&D expenditure on R&D cooperated project
and R&D delegation paid to other enterprises or institutions.
R&D Funding Raise refers to R&D funding an enterprise raise from various
sources, including corporate finance, financial institutions, government funds,
foreign funds and other funds.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology
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of China, China Statistics Yearbook on Science and Technology 2000-2008.
A significant increase in patents output
Patent is an important type of R&D output. In figure 3.5, the patent output con-
dition in Chinese large and medium size industrial firms is recorded. The number
of patent applications, innovation patents and owned patents all increased remark-
ably from 2000-2008. In 2008, number of patent applications in Chinese large and
medium size industrial enterprises was 12.2 million, of which invention patents ap-
plications amounted to 44000 units. Number of patent applications and innovation
patents grew by 27.3% and 21.3% respectively compared with 2007. Meanwhile,
there is a substantial increase in the number of invention patents owned by enter-
prises. In 2008, patents owned by large and medium industrial enterprises have
reached 5.6 million units, with growth of 27.7% compared with 2007.
Figure 3.5 Large&Medium Size Industrial Enterprises R&D
Patents Output (1000)
Note. Patent Applications refers to the number of patents applications which
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have been accepted by the official patents administration department in the
reporting year.
Innovation Patents refers to the number of innovation patents applications which
have been accepted by the official patents administration department in the re-
porting year.
Owned Patents refers to the number of patents owned by the enterprises, au-
thoritized by the official patents administration department and still within the
validity period in the report year.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology
of China, China Statistics Yearbook on Science and Technology 2000-2008.
New products development, output and export continued growth
Figures 3.6-3.8 provide the information about the new products40 producing
and export. There is similar growth pattern for new products development, sales
and export that all of them were growing steadily from 2000-2004 and dramatically
after 2005-2008. From 2004-2008, investment in new product development sustained
rapid growth, to 2008, reaching 309.58 billion Yuan, increased by 26.1% over 2007.
With increasing financial input in the new product development, the new product
sales were also increasing. In 2008, the new product sales revenue of China’s large
and medium industrial enterprises was 5.1 trillion Yuan, compared with 2007, annual
growth rate reached 24.4%. Percentage of new product sales revenue in total product
sales revenue accounted for 16%, increased by 0.3 % compared with 2007. New
40 In this context, a new product means a product that is new to the market rather than new to the firm.
A product is new to the market if it embodies some characteristics or combination of characteristics
not available in any product previously available from ANY firm.
Put differently a product is new to the market if it is not a perfect substitute for any product
previously available from ANY firm. A product is new to a firm but not to the market if it is not
a perfect substitute for any product previously available from that particular firm but IS a perfect
substitute for a product previously available from at least one other firm in the market.
91
product exports amounted to 1.321 trillion Yuan in 2008, up 33.1%, accounting for
sales of new products 25.8%, 1.6% higher than the previous year.
The rise of new product sales and export shows that enterprises’ ability to in-
novate continuously upgrade and further the international competitiveness has been
enhanced.
Figure 3.6 Funding for New Products Development
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology
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of China, China Statistics Yearbook on Science and Technology 2000-2008.
Figure 3.7 New Products Sales
Source. China National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology, China Statistics Yearbook on Science and Technology 2000-2008.
Figure 3.8 New Products Export
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology
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of China, China Statistics Yearbook on Science and Technology 2000-2008.
3.3.2 R&D activities across different ownership sectors
So far I have examined aggregate performance of R&D in Chinese industry. I now
turn to look at R&D performance across different ownership sectors.
R&D input of sample firms for different ownership categories
There are input disparities in financial and human capital across the four major
ownership segments.
From figure 3.9, we can find that R&D expenditures have been growing across
all the ownership sectors from 2000 to 2007. Due to the different sizes of different
ownership sectors, relative values will be more convincing. R&D intensity (R&D
expenditures/Sales Revenue) and R&D labor quality( R&D personnel/ Total Labor)
is shown in the figures 3.10 and 3.11.
In figure 3.10, we can see there is a downward trend in R&D intensity in all
these ownership sectors, from 2000 to 2003. Since 2003, their R&D investment
intensity started to grow gradually.
As evidence indicates that reform has substantially accelerated innovation in
Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs), SOEs have the highest R&D intensity. While
in recent years non-state owned industrial enterprises are playing increasingly more
important roles in Chinese economy, most are still relatively small compared with
SOEs and their ability to invest in R&D is limited. This is perhaps not too surpris-
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ing when it is remembered that state-owned firms are, on average, relatively large in
size and have privileged access to resources to fund adaptation, notably finance from
state banks, and have been encouraged by government to improve their technological
capacity.
R&D intensity is unexpectedly weak for foreign firms and foreign firms are
not directly and substantially contributing to China’s rising R&D intensity. But the
foreign sector does play a key role in motivating rising R&D intensity through at least
two indirect channels. The market competition and proliferation of product variety
associated with high industry FDI participation create pressures for domestic firms
in these FDI rich industries to mount extensive and effective R&D programs to hold
their own against foreign competition.
Figure 3.9 R&D Expenditures ( Million Yuan)
Note. SOEs-State Owned Enterprises, PVTs-Private Owned Enterprises, HKTs-
Enterprises owned by investors from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, FORs-
Foreign Owned Enterprises.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform
95
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
Figure 3.10 R&D Intensity (R&D Expenditure/Sales
Revenue)
Note. SOEs-State Owned Enterprises, PVTs-Private Owned Enterprises, HKTs-
Enterprises owned by investors from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, FORs-
Foreign Owned Enterprises.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
Due to comprehensive welfare system, SOEs are able to attract highly quali-
fied technical and management personnel. From figure 3.11 we can see that SOEs
are prominently more R&D intensive measured by R&D human capital. SOEs have
the highest technician-labour ratio ( R&D personnel/ Total personnel) and this ad-
vantage is enhanced with time. Technician-labour ratio in FORs and HKTs sectors
experienced strong decrease up to 2003, stable up to 2006 and they started to in-
crease. Again, PVTs and HKTs occupy the lower ranks.
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Figure 3.11 R&D Personnel/Total Labor
Note. SOEs-State Owned Enterprises, PVTs-Private Owned Enterprises, HKTs-
Enterprises owned by investors from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, FORs-
Foreign Owned Enterprises.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
The Chinese government’s R&D support is biased in favour of SOEs
The funding portion from government for different ownership firms are pre-
sented by the figure 3.12. State owned enterprises (SOEs) have traditionally obtained
significant government support. SOEs receive the largest fraction of R&D expen-
diture from the government, other sectors receive very little from the government
support.
Beginning at 7% level from 2000-2001, funding portion from government for
SOEs dramatically fell to 5% at 2002 and then be relatively stable between 4%-5%
from 2002-2007.
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Overall, the funding portion from government for SOEs is rather strong and
still much higher than other sectors, especially foreign sectors. 2000-2007, only
less than 1% of the R&D funding in foreign sector was from government support,
however there is an upward trend of Government funding support for foreign owned
enterprises (FORs).
Figure 3.12 R&D Funding from Government
Note. SOEs-State Owned Enterprises, PVTs-Private Owned Enterprises, HKTs-
Enterprises owned by investors from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, FORs-
Foreign Owned Enterprises.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
R&D output efficiency in different ownership sectors
Figure 3.13 reflects the R&D output difference in different ownership sectors.
Innovative activity within domestic sectors became more popular, the output of new
products per person rose gradually during the 2000-2007. However compared with
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foreign and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan sectors, the R&D performance of Chi-
nese domestic sectors SOEs and PVTs are still poor. Measured by value of new
products divided by R&D personnel, foreign sector lead in the R&D output perfor-
mance, which was almost five times as that in state sector between 2000 and 2007.
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan sector (HKTs) occupied the second position,
experiencing sharp increase during 2002-2005 and sharp decreasing during 2005-
2007. The technology efficiency gap between domestic and HKTs firms is smaller
than that between FORs.
After relative stability of around 800 thousand Yuan up to 2004, the average
of out put per person of private owned enterprises( PVTs) increased up to 1.6 mil-
lion Yuan until 2007. From 2000-2007, the R&D efficiency in SOEs was increasing
gradually and reached 1 million Yuan in 2007.
Figure 3.13 R&D Output Efficiency (Value of New
Products/R&D Personel) (10,000Yuan/Person)
Note. SOEs-State Owned Enterprises, PVTs-Private Owned Enterprises, HKTs-
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Enterprises owned by investors from Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan, FORs-
Foreign Owned Enterprises.
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
3.3.3 R&D activities in different industries
Industries Category
Industry is also important, in addition to ownership on firms’ R&D activities.
The list and explanation of the different industries dummies are shown in the Table
3.1.
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Table 3.1 Description of Different Industries41
UTILITIES Producer/supplier of electricity/thermal energy/
natural gas/ water
MINING Coal mining/washing, Oil/ Natural gas mining,
Ferrous/Non-ferrous/ Non-metal ore mining
FOOD Primary Products, Food, Beverages, Tobacco
TEXTILE Textile, Apparel/shoes/hats, Leather/fur/feather,
Furniture, Timber processing/ wood/bamboo/rattan
Stationery, Sporting goods
PAPER Paper/Printing products,
Media recording reproduction
CHEMICAL Petroleum processing/refining, Nuclear fuel,
Chemical materials/products, Medicine,
Rubber/Plastic products
MINERAL Non metallic mineral products
METAL Ferrous/Non-ferrous metal smelting/rolling,
Fabricating metal products
ELECTRICAL Electrical machinery/equipment,
Communications devices, Computers
Other electronics, Instuments, Office equipment
MACHINERY General/ Specialized equipment
TRANSPORTATION Transportation equipments
HIGH-TECH Aircraft/Spacecraft, Computers, Office equipments,
Electronic, Telecommunication equipments,
Pharmaceuticals, Medical equipments
41 Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology
for Industrial Enterprises 2000-2007.
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Different industries R&D intensity in 2007
Significant differences of R&D intensity among different industries can be
found in figure 3.14. Firms in machinery, transportation equipment, electrical and
high tech industries tend to invest more in R&D than firms in other industries.
For machinery industry, more than 3% of the sales revenue has been spent on
R&D investment. However for utility industry, there is only less than 0.5% sales
revenue was put in R&D investment.
Figure 3.14 R&D Intensity(R&D Expenditure/Sales Revenue)
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development of Reform
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
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R&D output in Different industries (New Products Sales Revenue/Sales
Revenue) 2007
Same as R&D input in different industries, R&D output which is measured by
new products/sales revenue and new products export are also different across indus-
tries. (Figure 3.15 and 3.16)
Due to strong R&D input, sales revenues for firms in machinery, transportation
equipment, electrical and high-tech industries rely more on new products.
Electrical and high-tech industries had extraordinary performance in new prod-
ucts export in 2007. More than 40 percent of their new products were sold to the for-
eign markets. Traditional industries, such as textile relative and non-metallic mineral
products also had kept their advantage in the new products exports.
Figure 3.15 New Products/Sales Revenue
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
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Figure 3.16 New Products Export Ratio
Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development and Reform
Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for Industrial En-
terprises 2000-2007.
3.4 Econometric models and variables choosing
The empirical analysis in this chapter concentrates on how the different ownerships
impact on the R&D investment decision, R&D output and efficiency of the firms.
3.4.1 R&D investment
As potential outcome variable in the empirical analysis, the R&D expenditure is con-
sidered. Sales revenue, ownership sectors, industries dummies will be included in the
R&D decision as independent variables. The values of R&D expenditure and sales
revenue have been adjusted to remove the effects of the inflation.
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In the R&D investment regression model, tHf _ , M ,
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Sales revenue, influences R&D investment amount through the finance con-
straints. It is a well supported fact that proportionality of R&D investment to size
and it is likely that the large firms more often get subsidies (Cohen and klepper 1996;
Duguet 2004). Ln_sale is chosen to represent the firm size and the correlation be-
tween ln_sale and the expenditure of R&D is expected to be positive.
SOEs, PVTs, FORs and HKTs are 4 ownership dummies used to represent
State Owned Enterprises, Private Owned Enterprises, Hong Kong, Macao and Tai-
wan Investors’ Owned Enterprises and Foreign Owned Enterprises. Based on the
descriptive statistics results at last section, I assume there is different characters of
R&D expenditures across different ownership sectors. Due to easy access to exter-
nal financial support and bigger size, there might be positive relationship between
state ownership and R&D input. Due to the slow accumulation of legalized private
property and less support from bank, the financial constraints are barriers for domes-
tic private enterprises to entry into high-tech areas and negative relationship between
R&D investment amount and private ownership is expected. Foreign owned enter-
prises may benefit from R&D developed in another country by the mother company,
and may have no incentive to carry out additional R&D in the host country. I assume
negative relationship between R&D investment and foreign ownership.
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Industry dummies will be used to investigate the importance of technological
opportunity in explaining the innovation rate. Geroski (1990) argues that industries in
the early phase of the product cycle may be characterised by high rates of innovation,
firm turnover and a high level of technological opportunity which stimulate R&D.
In particular, firms in technology-based industries are forced to be steadily active in
the innovation process and secure their market competitiveness (Malerba and Ors-
enigo 1997; Pavitt 1984). Duguet (2004) summarized that on the one hand, there are
different conditions of demand, technology and appropriation that determine R&D
investments across the industries. On the other hand, the technology policies and
subsidies are correlated to the industries that use certain technologies.
3.4.2 R&D output and efficiency
R&D productivity and efficiency test-Frontier function
Using a frontier model, Farrell (1957) defines the technical efficiency of any
firm as being determined by the distance between the realized output of the firm
and maximum possible output on the production frontier, given the set of the firm’s
inputs. Allocative efficiency is determined by the difference between the actual input
bundle and the optimal input bundle along the production frontier, given input prices.
The production function frontier is taken to be the production function of the most
efficient firms. The firm’s technical efficiency reflects the quality of its input and the
efficiency of its management. Forsund and Hjalmarsson (1974) define the concept of
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efficiency as, in a broad sense, being used to characterize the utilization of resources,
i.e. efficiency is a statement about the performance of processes transforming a set
of inputs into a set of outputs. Efficiency is a relative concept: the performance of an
economic unit must be compared with a standard.
In practice, production functions are not known and actual observations of firms
are not on the frontier. Furthermore, the observed performance of a firm is affected
by exogenous shocks over which the firm has no control in addition to endogenous
factors relating to inefficiencies. (Zhang et al., 2003)
Specifically, Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) propose
the following stochastic specification of the production frontier:
{ _ z- M J? ! K
Where { is the output, z is the vector of inputs, and - is the vector of un-
known parameters defining the production function. In this specification, the random
variable ? has a standard normal distribution that captures the effects of omitted vari-
ables and measurement errors. The random variable  characterizes the difference
between the maximum output on the frontier and the realized output; therefore, 
should be non-negative.
In the stochastic frontier approach, the frontier production function is estimated
statistically. Following Zhang et al. (2003), in this chapter, the R&D production
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function is converted to the following stochastic specification:
x _ ,R M ,m m M ,n n M
z
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z
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where  denotes technical inefficiency and D p JR] =TK is the idiosyncratic error.
The value of a firm’s R&D output, x , is measured by the value added to the
new products( n_tHf_{ ).
A firm’s R&D inputs, L and K, are measured, respectively, by the total num-
ber of the firm’s R&D personnel(n_tHf_n) and by its total expenditure on non-
personnel R&D expenditure(n_tHf_m). The latter includes both internal and
external R&D expenditures but excludes production cost and loan payment. These
variables have been adjusted to remove the effects of the inflation. The industries
dummies and ownership dummies are also considered as the factors which influence
the R&D output.
Technical inefficiency  has a truncated normal distribution, with mean ex-
plained by ownership and R&D infrastructure
 9 p
MJ7]=
T
K] 7 _ 3R M
z
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Ownership refers to dummy variables for SOEs, PVTs, HKTs, FORs. In-
vestigated in the literature reviews section, ownership structure can influence the
firm’s objectives, reduce bureaucratic intervention, and realign managerial incen-
tives, which in turn affect the firm’s performance. In state sector, politicians often
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choose not to maximize profits and may lack strong incentives to monitor the man-
agers. Agency problem might be higher in state sector than other sectors, which may
lead to R&D inefficiency in state sector. It is typically more costly for firms to operate
abroad than domestically. Local firms have superior knowledge of local market, con-
sumer preferences and business practices. Foreign firms must therefore have some
other advantages over domestic firms in order to compete. This can be in the form
of higher productivity levels, or through greater market power, for example through
owning a patent (Griffith et al., 2002).
Infrastructure (kK represents firms’ R&D infrastructure investment. It is
now usually recognized that investment in physical infrastructure, including transport
services, telecommunication and power can improve the productivity of all inputs in
the production process and thus strengthen long-run growth performance of firms.
3.5 The empirical results
The empirical results are presented at table 3.2 and 3.3. The results include 2 parts.
In the table 3.2, results of regression model of R&D investment are reported. F value
of the R&D investment regression model rejects the null hypothesis and implys that
at least some of the regression parameters are nonzero, so that the regression equation
does have some validity in fitting the data.
In the table 3.3, results of R&D production frontier function regression have
been reported, from which information of R&D output and efficiency can be found.
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Based on the Wald AT value, we are able to reject the null hypothesis, again indicating
that the coefficients for the model are not simultaneously equal to zero and the overall
significance of the regression model.
3.5.1 R&D investment
The results of R&D investment regression model can be seen from the column 2,
table 3.2. Coefficient estimates have the expected signs and are significant at con-
ventional levels. Sales revenue, as well ownership and industry dummies have strong
influences on R&D intensity.
How these factors influence the R&D expenditure is summarized below:
(1) Sales Revenue
R&D expenditure depends on sales revenue, with the positive coefficient 0.99
at 1% level.
R&D investment usually involves higher risk than investment in tangible phys-
ical assets, and asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders is particu-
larly severe in this case. Imperfect capital markets are more likely to result in under-
financing of this type of investment, and firms may often have to rely on own re-
sources to fund R&D projects. Higher sales revenue enables firms with more free
cash to support high risk R&D investment. Cohen and Klepper (1996) argue that
because appropriability conditions confine firms to exploit their innovations chiefly
through their own output, and firm growth due to innovation tends to be limited,
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larger firms can typically average the fixed costs of their innovations over a greater
level of output. As a consequence, R&D investment tends to increase with firm size.
(2) Ownership types
Coefficients between the ownership dummies and R&D investment indicate
that ownership types exert a substantial impact on R&D investment. R&D expendi-
ture is significantly positively related to state sector, with coefficient 0.36 and nega-
tively related to foreign sector, with the coefficient !R\UU. R&D investment is lower
in private sector but not significant.
Time expected to complete R&D and time until commercialization of R&D
is long. Realization of cash flow from investment is in distant future. State owned
enterprises can get lower interest rate than enterprises from other sectors due to state
protection and hence apply a lower discount rate than other firms and then value
future revenues of R&D outcome more. Policy makers might encourage state owned
enterprises to undertake R&D in order to increase chances of survival, preventing
large employment losses and generating good supply of skilled manpower.
In most situations the market will fail to provide sufficient private incentives
to innovation since innovators face appropriability problems (Arrow,1962; Nelson,
1959). The reason is that R&D has some characteristics of a public good, so that the
private return on innovation will be lower than its social return.
Ownership in Chinese private firms are concentrated and relationship based.
Shareholders tend to be well-informed and active in firm decisions and likely to in-
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fluence managerial behavior, particularly investment decisions, which might be more
cautious. Slow accumulation of legal private property and less bank support make
financial constraints barriers to domestic private entry into high-tech areas where re-
quire high fixed-cost investments (Wen et al., 2002).
Finally, affiliates of foreign owned companies may benefit from R&D devel-
oped in another country by the mother company, and may have no incentive to carry
out additional R&D in the host country.
(3) Industries
Firms’ R&D investment does not only depend on firm-specific characteristics,
industry characteristics have also been shown to affect firms’ R&D investment. There
are important cross-industry differences of R&D investment. For the 10 industries, 6
of the estimates are significant at 1% level, with 2 of them are positive. As predicted,
the coefficients estimates for the machine and electrical industries is larger than for
the rest of the industries. Enterprises in the machine and electrical spend more rela-
tive to participants from other industries. Utility industry has the lowest level of R&D
investment. Estimate for high technology industry is negative, which is unusual but
might be able to be explained by higher R&D efficiency.
Differences in technological opportunity and in expected demand growth may
explain inter industry differences in R&D effort. Firms in technology-based indus-
tries are forced to be steadily active in the innovation process and secure their mar-
ket competitiveness (Malerba and Orsenigo 1997; Pavitt, 1984; Geroski, 1990). As
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living standards rise, we anticipate that the composition of goods and services will
become more technologically intensive. Firms in these technical intensive industries
will spend more on R&D than other industries.
Table 3.2 Model Estimates (R&D Investment) 42,43
Variables Ln_R&D
Industry Dummies
Utilities !R\[XTT$$
J!Y\Z[K
High-Tech !R\WRZY$$
J!U\[YK
Food !R\UY[V$$
J!U\[VK
Textile !R\T[[R$$
J!U\SSK
Paper R\ST[R
JS\URK
Chemical R\S[VXM
JS\[TK
Mineral R\SR[U
JS\STK
Metal R\RYUV
JR\YUK
Electrical R\ZRUT$$
JY\[TK
Machinery R\ZSRZ$$
JZ\VZK
Ownership Dummies
SOEs R\UXTZ$$
JW\WSK
PVTs !R\RRTU
J!R\RVK
FORs !R\UURU$$
J!W\SXK
Ln_Sales R\[Z[Y$$
JUX\VVK
Cons !V\SYUY$$
J!ST\S[K
No. of obs 227
F 204.97
Prob`F 0.0000
42 Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development of Reform Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for
Industrial Enterprises 2000-2007.
43 z-scores in parentheses; **, * and M singnificant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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3.5.2 R&D output and efficiency
I am going to explain the regression results of R&D production frontier function in
two parts as in table 3.3.
First part includes the variables that influence the R&D output level which is
represented by variable Ln_R&D_Y. Second part includes variables that influence
R&D inefficiency which is represented by variable 7.
Factors influence the R&D output level:
R&D output, measured by value added to the new products, is positively related
to R&D inputs such as capital and labor input. Industry dummies and ownership
dummies also have significant impacts on R&D output.
(1) R&D input
R&D output increase with R&D input. R&D output elasticity of R&D capital
(Ln_R&D_K) and labor (Ln_R&D_L) input are statistically significant at 0.82 and
0.39. The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
Technological innovations are typically embodied in new machinery (embod-
ied technological change). Further, De Long and Summers (1991) argue that coun-
tries with high capital investment rates tend to be those with high productivity growth.
Howitt (1999) demonstrates how the introduction of capital in the intermediate pro-
duction can establish a positive correlation between innovation and capital intensity.
The number of employees in the R&D sector is considered as the measure of
human capital in the empirical work. The ability to envision, design and implement
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a R&D project strongly depends on the level of formal and informal skills of its
employees and managers, the firm’s stock of human capital. These skills affect the
ability of a firm to generate new ideas as well as to take advantage of and use the
existing common pool of technological or scientific knowledge, whether basic or
applied (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Cockburn et al., 1998).
(2) Industry dummies44
There are important industry differences in R&D output. High technology
industry has significant advantage in new product producing. The coefficients of
high_tech industry is 0.56 at 1% level. The coefficients of chemical industry is posi-
tive and significant, however with the small magnitude as 0.04. Utility and chemical
industries have negative impact on R&D output.
Industries influence on R&D output level can be judged from market com-
petition conditions. In more competitive industries, enterprises tend to be more effi-
cient in order to minimize the probability of bankruptcies. Technological opportunity
might differ across industries, as many empirical studies have documented (Cohen
and Klepper, 1996). These differences may translate into different parameters for
economies of scale and of scope, as well as into different set-up costs of R&D across
industries.
44 Regression of R&D efficiency which contains all the industry dummies can not be carried properly
by the STATA software because of invalid data in some of the industries. By trying different groups of
industry dummies, Utilities, High Technology, Chemical and Electrical industries have been chosen
to test the different R&D efficiency across industries. Other industries, which are not included in
the regression, do have similar character in R&D or production organization with one of the industry
which is in the regression model. Against industry dummies in the regression results, "Mining" was
the omitted category. Since "Transportation equipment" had fewer firms, this category was combined
with "Machinery".
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(3) Ownership dummies
There are remarkable differences of R&D output across different ownership
sectors. Compared to foreign firms, R&D output level is lower for state sector and
private sector. Use the Hongkong, Taiwan and Macao sector as benchmark, the coef-
ficient of state sector is !R\W[ at 1% level. The coefficient of private sector is negative
but with small magnitude as !R\RU. The coefficient of foreign sector is 0.17 at 1%
level. These results indicate that foreign firms are leading at R&D research and more
productive in new product production.
Factors influence the R&D inefficiency (7):
Ownership dummies and infrastructure investment have strong impacts on R&D
inefficiency (7K.
(1) Ownership
Ownership factors are important determinants of R&D efficiency. From the
regression results, foreign owned enterprises have by far the highest level of the R&D
efficiency. The coefficient of foreign sector on R&D inefficiency is !U\UW at 1%
level. The coefficient between Hongkong and Taiwan sector and inefficiency is !S\WT
at 10% level. R&D inefficiency is higher for domestic state sector and private sector
compared with foreign sector and Hongkong sector, however they are not significant.
These results imply that firms from state sector who possess more innovation
resources and government support are not the ones performing more efficiently.
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The reason might be in state sector, politicians often do not focus only on max-
imizing profits and may lack strong incentives to monitor managers.
After years of reform, SOEs are found that they still have not yet assigned
profit a proper weight in their objectives and government instructions have strong in-
fluence on their operation decision. SOEs have been used for purposes other than the
profit maximization for shareholders - such as the maintenance of urban employment
levels, direct control over sensitive industries, or politically motivated job placement
(Clarke, 2003). Bai et al. (2000) point out that during transition, SOEs are charged
with the multitasks of social welfare provision and efficient production. This in turn
creates several problems. First, there are incentive problems: the presence of multiple
tasks often dulls the intensity of incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Second,
many of these goals are not easily measured and there is no obvious way of balanc-
ing them one against the other. This creates monitoring difficulties. Second, the
policy of continued state involvement sets up a conflict of interest between the state
as controlling shareholder and other shareholders. In using its control for purposes
other than value maximization, the state exploits minority shareholders who have no
other way to benefit from their investment (Clarke, 2003). SOEs are privileged ac-
cess to resources to fiscal subsidies, notably financial capital from state banks, and
have been encouraged by government to improve their technological capacity (Qian
and Roland, 1996; Coady and Wang, 2000; Bruun and Bennett, 2002).
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SOEs have soft budget constraint: they are not forced to cover expenses from
sales and income, and they receive credit from state-owned banks for reasons un-
related to risk (Kornai, 1986). Managers are not concerned about survival, but like
firms in other redistributive economies (Kornai, 1986). Agency problems may be
higher in state sector, which leads to R&D inefficiency. Since a typical R&D project
involves a large sunk cost due to the low liquidation value of the projects, the moral
hazard and adverse selection problems accompanying state sector are more severe
and harder to be solved in R&D projects. Due to lack the monitoring mechanism, the
use of the R&D funding from government is not efficient.
Under foreign ownership, managers may face stronger incentives to reduce
costs and to innovate. Thus, we expect these sectors to have higher R&D efficiency
and productivity.
Soft budget constraint is an useful concept for analyzing problems in centrally
planned and transition economies, particularly those associated with state-owned
firms. Soft budget constraint may make a centralized economy inefficient in R&D.
As a result of soft budget constraints, SOEs lack the commitment to stop bad R&D
projects. R&D termination rate for the diseconomy project in foreign sector is much
higher than the termination rate of state sectors at 1995 (Zhang et al., 2003).
(2) Infrastructure
Infrastructure investment has noticeable effect on R&D inefficiency. The coef-
ficient between infrastructure investment (Ln_Infra) and R&D inefficiency is !R\UU
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at 1% level. Higher infrastructure investment tends to decrease the R&D inefficiency,
in another words, improve the efficiency.
Table 3.3 Model Estimates (R&D Efficiency) 45,46,47
Variables Ln_R&D_Y
Industry Dummies
Utilities !R\VSTS$$
J!VY[V\XYK
High-Tech R\WWWU$$
JW[Y[\VXK
Chemical !R\VXVX$$
J!T\UMRVK
Electrical R\RUWR$$
JVTVX\ZTK
Ownership Dummies
SOEs !R\WZWX$$
J!U\SMRVK
PVTs !R\RUTVT$$
J![ZUU\XVK
FORs R\SXXZ$$
JSVTZU\WSK
R&D Input
Ln_R&D_K R\ZSXT$$
JS[TTV\RWK
Ln_R&D_L R\UZ[T$$
J[UUU\VTK
Cons R\XVX[$$
JXVSW\[XK
7 (inefficiency)
SOEs !R\[XWY
J!S\RXK
PVTs !R\[XXT
J!S\R[K
HKTs !S\WSXRM
J!S\YSK
FORs !U\UVYT$$
J!U\TXK
Ln_Infra !R\UUVR$$
J!U\VXK
No. of obs 221
Wald AT 1.63e+11
Prob`AT 0.0000
45 Source. National Bureau of Statistics and National Development of Reform Commission of China, Statistics on Science and Technology for
Industrial Enterprises 2000-2007.
46 z-scores in parentheses; **, * and M singnificant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
47 Investments on R&D usually have a long term profile. In the R&D efficiency regression, if I
add past R&D investment (lags) as explanatory variables; there might be improvement in the result.
However, due to the main purpose of the chapter is to test how the different ownerships impact on the
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3.6 Conclusion
The aim of this Chapter has been to investigate the determinants of both the level
of R&D spending and the efficiency of this spending - the amount of innovative
progress made in relation to the level of R&D spending - for a sample of large and
medium size Chinese industrial enterprises from different ownership sectors during
2000-2007.
Undoubtedly, firms have strong incentives to compete over time to develop
new products or reduce their production costs and so improve market performance.
Innovation through spending on R&D is a well-recognized means of developing these
new technologies and products, but, just as firms have incentives to lower production
costs, so too they have incentives to undertake innovation as efficiently as possible.
The period 2000-2007 was a period of transition for the Chinese economy and
a key feature of this transition process was the introduction of new forms of enter-
prise ownership. So alongside traditional state-owned enterprises there were private
enterprises and foreign-owned enterprises. Consequently it is important to under-
stand how ownership affects both the level of R&D investment and the level of R&D
efficiency of different enterprises.
The research and development (R&D) activities of Chinese industrial firms is
investigated by dividing firms into different ownership groups. The hierarchy of fi-
nancial and technology capacities of firms cross different ownership sectors has been
R&D efficiency. At this stage, I will not try to keep the regression simple and easy to be explained.
But in future research, this is an important task I will do to improve the research result.
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maintained and even enlarged with the deepening of macro economy liberalization
since economy transformation in China.
This chapter contributes to the empirical research of R&D efficiency of firms
under various forms of ownership in transition economy. While there have been a
number of theoretical works show that R&D activities in centralized economies are
less efficient than those in decentralized market economy, and some empirical studies
examine the determinants of inter-firm differences (including ownership and institu-
tional factors) in productive efficiency in developed economy, empirical analysis of
ownership impact on firm R&D performance in transition economy is relatively rare
(Zhang et al., 2003; Qian and Xu, 1998; Huang and Xu 1998; Goel, 1999; Frydman
et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2001).
Before I use inferential statistics to draw the main conclusions, I provide the
simple summaries about the data by using basic descriptive statistics measures, to-
gether with simple graphics illustrations. A variety of evidence indicates that reform
has substantially accelerated innovation in China’s enterprises.
I undertake a multi-tasks study of both R&D spending and R&D efficiency
for medium and large Chinese industrial firms from 2000 to 2007. The dataset I
use contains panel data which allows studying dynamics and reflecting the recent
economy situation, compared with work by Zhang et al. (2003) which find ownership
to be a contributing factor of R&D efficiencies by using a cross-section database of
Chinese large and medium industrial enterprises in 1995.
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I found that the presence of state ownership is positively related with R&D
investment, but negatively related to R&D performance. Foreign firms are technical
leader in Chinese industries and have advantage in R&D efficiency.
These points out the fact that while the firms possessing more innovation re-
sources and government support – the state-owned enterprises – undertake more
R&D, they are not the ones performing better technically. Empirical results also
show significant cross industries differences in R&D investment and output.
This research has potentially important policy implications because research
and development (R&D) have become increasingly important not only for individ-
ual firm’s survival and growth, but also the whole economy development. However,
in order to develop these policy implications it is important to have a clear concep-
tual framework, and I turn to this in the next Chapter where I develop a model that
generates predictions consistent with the empirical findings reported above.
One important caveat to the work reported in this Chapter is that since China is
still transitioning from its central planning legacy, the behavior of firms – particularly
state-owned enterprises - may be driven by beliefs and expectations (culture) that are
still in a process of change through the process of transition, and so the observed
behavioural differences across different ownership structures may be different from
those that would be observed in a longer-run steady-state outcome.
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Chapter 4
R&D Competition in A Mixed Duopoly
Model, with Endogenous Spillovers
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I present empirical evidence for a sample of large and medium
size Chinese industrial enterprises from 2000-2007 to show that while state owned
firms have higher R&D investment when compared with private firms, their R&D ef-
ficiencies are lower. The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical model to help
explain this phenomenon.
Since I am dealing with a set up in which there are state owned public firms
compete against private firms, the analyzing methodology falls in the area of mixed
duopoly48 which have been typically observed in the transition economy.
With China still transitioning from its central planning legacy, Chinese state
owned enterprises (SOEs) operate not only as firms, but also as mini-welfare states
and have to bear increasingly heavy ‘social burdens’ or ‘policy burdens’ such as pro-
48 Some researchers have summarized the differences between the mixed duopoly and private duopoly
under different appropriability conditions of research results. In the easy imitation assumption, Joanna
Poyago-Theotoky (1998) concludes that in the mixed duopoly due to the free rider problem, private
firm cuts down on R&D and leaves the public firm to carry out more R&D. So in the mixed duopoly
the private firm reduces its R&D investment relative to the private duopoly, while the public firm
spends relatively more in R&D.
In contrast, Delbono and Denicolo (1993) have examined when imitation is not possible, having a
public, welfare-maximizing firm compete with a private, profit-maximizing, firm results in both firms
reducing their R&D effort and thus alleviates the overinvestment problem which happens in the private
duopoly condition.
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viding employees with lifetime employment, inexpensive housing, free health care,
and pensions. When independent social safety agencies are missing, it is very impor-
tant to keep the social function of public firms even it might influence the efficiency
of the economy. But on the other hand, it might increase the efficiency because for a
transition economy, social instability caused by mass unemployment would create an
undesirable general environment for business and thereby lower the overall efficiency
in the economy.
R&D allows firms to develop new processes to produce existing goods more
efficiently or indeed develop new products that allow it to expand sales and improve
market performance. Undoubtedly, firms have strong incentives to compete over time
to develop new products or reduce their costs. There are two key factors of R&D
which have strong influence on firms’ R&D, one is uncertainty of outcomes and
another is publicity. The uncertainty of outcomes makes it difficult for investors to
judge the value of R&D investment and decide the magnitude and allocation of R&D
expenditures. The investment decision in R&D by profit-maximizing firms is guided
by the return to this investment. While the generation of scientific knowledge through
R&D is costly, transferring this knowledge is effectively zero. Once produced, the
knowledge will not diminish or degrade as the result of usage by different firms.
R&D spillover has emerged as one of the most active issue that might influence the
firms R&D investment decision.
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In this chapter, I want to address the issues: (i) how the operation strategy in-
fluences firms’ R&D decision, (ii) whether the R&D spillover effects of public and
private firm are the equal, (iii) How ownership and spillover influence the R&D effi-
ciency. This chapter presents a theory to explain how ownership structure influences
the innovation performances of firms. The theory explains that as long as SOEs con-
tinue their dual roles as productive entities and social safety nets, they cannot be
purely profit-oriented, and continue to have poor innovation performance.
The most common framework for investigating the strategic effects of R&D de-
cisions on oligopolistic competition is a two-period game with simultaneous moves at
each stage. In the first period, each firm selects a level of (cost-reducing& quality im-
proving) R&D investment. Upon observing the resulting improved technologies, in
the second period each firm competes on product market to decide quantity (Cournot)
or price (Bertrand) . Typically, all the models set R&D spillover as either given or
same to all the firms. In this chapter, I would like to endogenize spillover in which
firm can protect the technology improvement they have got. This extension is crucial
for explaining both R&D spending and efficiency.
In this chapter, I adopt a three stage-game. In first stage, firms make R&D
expenditure which lead to a profit increasing (cost reducing & quality improving);
In the second stage, firms choose the level of technological improvement they would
like to share with the rival; and production quantity will be decided in the final stage.
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My main findings can be summarized as follows: R&D spillover is asymmet-
rical. While a welfare-maximising state-owned enterprise will recognize and value
the positive externality flowing from its R&D and so choose a minimum level of in-
tellectual protection – maximum spillover – a profit-maximising firm will choose the
maximum protection (minimum spillover).
This has two further implications: Because of its higher spillover the public
firm will see a higher return to its R&D than the private firm and so do more of it;
Because the private firm benefits from both the higher R&D spend and the higher
spillover of the public firm while the public firm gets a minimum spillover from the
lower level of R&D by the private firm, the total amount of progress made by the
public firm relative to its R&D is lower than the total amount of progress made by
the private firm in relation to its R&D. Thus by endogenising the level of spillover I
have been able to explain the key findings of the empirical research reported in my
previous chapter.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2, Literature review; Section 3, Set
a R&D model of mixed duopoly; Section. 4, present the equilibrium R&D spillover
rate, intensity and efficiency; Section 5, Explain the results; and Section 6, Concludes
the paper and some proofs are given in the appendix.
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4.2 Literature review
Mixed market theory, characterized by the presence of both profit maximizing private
firms and welfare maximizing public sector firms has been widely applied to the
research of innovation in recent years (Merrill and Schneider, 1966; De Fraja and
Delbono, 1990). For example, in the quantity-setting Cournot game, the social and
private benefits of cost-reducing innovation are different. Indeed, the private benefit,
which is given by the increase in future profits of a single firm, generally speaking is
lower than the social benefit, which also includes the change in other firms’ profits
and in consumers’ surplus (Delbono and Denicono, 1991).
I would like to investigate the following questions from the existing works.
1.Are R&D technology same for both firms?
Basically, all the papers I have surveyed assume that both public and private
firms have an identical product technology.
Some of them assume that firms can engage in cost reducing process innova-
tions in order to lower their marginal costs and there are diminishing returns to the
level of R&D expenditure (Zikos, 2007; Molto et al., 2010).
Some of them assume that the marginal cost is constant and independent of
the quality and can make demand-enhancing investment into quality. (Ishibashi and
Kaneko, 2008; Buehler and Wey 2010).
Another popular research direction assumes that the firm’s instantaneous prob-
ability of innovating (given no success to date) is an increasing function of its R&D
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expenditure. i.e., R&D is modeled as a memoryless Poisson process. Firm inno-
vates first is awarded an exogenously determined prize, which is the same for the two
firms (Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Naseem and Oehmke, 2006; Delbono and Denicolo,
1993).
2.Assumption of spillover and its influence
Innovation spillover can happen as imperfect patent protection, ‘inventing-
around’ an innovation, industrial espionage, and so on (Poyago-Theotoky, 1998).
Under easy imitation assumption, Poyago-Theotoky (1998) shows there is un-
derinvestment problem because firm might well leave R&D to its rivals to carry out
and then reap benefits through easy imitation.
In a winner-take-all patent race, there is overinvestment in R&D in a non-
cooperative equilibrium due to duplication of effort (Delbono and Denicolo, 1993).
Molto et al. (2010) assume that the degree of spillovers among the duopolists
is exogenously given and concludes that the R&D of the private firm may increase or
decrease, depending on the rate of spillovers. The optimal subsidy is always positive
and increasing in the rate of spillover.
Given the asymmetric objectives of the firms, Naseem and Oehmke (2006)
assume that spillover from the public firm will be greater than from the private firm.
This is consistent with the observation that public sector firms are more open to
disseminating their research results to private. However, they did not investigate
how this asymmetric spillover influences the public and private firms’ different R&D
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investment volume and efficiency. For both the public and private firms, research
effort is decreasing in input spillover from the rival, but is ambiguous for their own
input spillover.
3.Amount of R&D
Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) use a patent race model where each firm
chooses both its innovation size and R&D expenditure, to show both the public firm
invests too much in R&D and that its innovation size is too small.
Buehler and Wey (2010) derive sufficient conditions for public investment to
crowd out private investment. They characterize the conditions under which individ-
ual investments (prices, respectively) in the mixed duopoly are higher (lower) than in
the standard duopoly. Heywood and Ye (2009) also proof in duopoly model that the
public firm invests more in R&D than its private rival.
Gil-Moltó et al. (2011) finds support for the empirical claim that privatization
is followed by a scaling down of the R&D activity. Other things being equal, to-
tal R&D investment and output are always higher in the mixed duopoly than in the
private duopoly.
Poyago-Theotoky (1998) find that in a mixed duopoly the public firm invests
more in R&D than the private firm. Public firm can be used in tackling the problem
of underinvestment caused by easy imitation.
In the winer-take all condition, Delbono and Denicolo (1993) show that in Nash
equilibrium, the public firm invests less in R&D than the private one. But they also
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assume that if the social benefit is greater than the private one, the public firm has an
additional incentive to invest. And if spillover in the R&D activity or easy imitation
can turn the R&D race into a waiting game, it will reduce the duplication of effort or
even leading to underinvestment in R&D. Under these circumstances, the public firm
would find it optimal to invest more than private one.
4.R&D efficiency
Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) show that the private firm has lower costs
because it undertakes excessive cost-reducing activities by employing a hotelling
model where production costs are endogenous. Nett (1994) studied the public firm’s
behavior in choosing to produce at a higher than the private firm’s marginal cost and
showed that privatization may be welfare-improving.
Using a model in which only a public firm can carry out the cost-reducing in-
vestment, Nishimori and Ogawa (2002) find that the public firm has a lower cost
technology when it is a monopolist than when it compete against private firms. Lin
and Ogawa (2005) show that although the private firm carries out the R&D invest-
ment to reduce cost, the public firm may not have an incentive to reduce its production
cost in equilibrium.
Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008) analyze price and quality competition in a mixed
duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state owned
public firm. They show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower
quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient.
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5.Does mixed duopoly theory apply in China
After years of reform, Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) are found that
they still have not yet assigned profit a proper weight in their objectives and gov-
ernment instructions have strong influence on their operation decision. SOEs have
been used for purposes other than the profit maximization for shareholders–such as
the maintenance of urban employment levels, direct control over sensitive industries,
or politically motivated job placement (Clarke, 2003). Mixed duopoly theory can ex-
plain that as long as state owned firms continue their dual roles as productive entities
and social safety nets, they cannot be purely profit-oriented, and continue to have
poorer innovation and financial performance compared with private firm because pri-
vate firms have strong profit incentives and sharply focus on their financial bottom
lines (Bai et al., 2000; Byrd and Gelb, 1990; Hu, 1997).
4.3 Model
There are two firms A and B that produce homogenous products in the market. A is a
public firm and B is a private firm. They play a 3 stage game to decide their optimal
R&D level and spillover rate. In the first stage, firms make R&D expenditure which
leads to profit increasing (cost reducing & quality improving). In the second stage,
firms choose the level of technology improvement they would like to share with the
rival. Production quantity will be decided in the final stage.
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4.3.1 Stage I R&D activites
Assumption 1 If let c ( resp. d) denote the R&D undertaken by the public ( resp.
private ) firm. R&D generates discoveries via the R&D production function:
kc_  JcK] (resp.kd_  JdK),
Where  satisfies all the usual assumptions: JRK _ R]  RJK ` R]  RRJK ^ R\
In this assumption, I assume there is no technological difference between the
two types of firms. This is a crucial assumption which can make sure that the dif-
ference in R&D efficiency comes from endogenous decided spillover.  represents
the quantity of R&D factor inputs witch can be capital, labour, land or raw materials.
 RJK ` R indicates that as additional units of R&D inputs are used, the quantity of
output also increases.  RRJK ^ R means as additional units of the input are employed,
output increases but at a decreasing rate.
Research and development intensity refers to a company’s resources and ca-
pacity for new technological development. In some contemporary research on new
product development assumes that R&D intensity has a positive impact on new prod-
uct outcomes. In product management studies (Hill and Snell, 1989; Szymanski
et al., 1993), R&D intensity is expected to be related positively to product advan-
tage, because firms with greater technology development resources are more likely
to create products with more innovative features. In an investigation of 122 indus-
trial firms, Cooper (1983) observes that R&D intensity has a significant effect on a
firm’s ability to produce "highly innovative and high-technology products-ones that
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are mechanically and technically complex, affect strongly customer use behavior,
and feature several differential advantages." Hill and Snell (1989) suggest the possi-
bility that the higher returns of related firms arise from the beneficial effects of the
strategy on productivity, although again, confirmation requires further research. The
positive relationship between stock concentration and productivity indicates the im-
portance that a constituency of powerful stockholders has for the efficiency of a firm.
Acs et al. (1994) present the empirical results that the innovative output of all firms
rise along with an increase in the amount of R&D input, both in private corporations
as well as in university laboratories.
The issue of ‘returns to scale in R&D’ has been the subject of many researchs
on the basis of patent statistics. The production of patents is one of the proxies used
to assess the value generated by the R&D investments and the creation of inventive
output. Over time, there has been a documented drop in the ratio of patents to R&D
spending (Kortum, 1993), an indication that the productivity of R&D might be de-
creasing. In a study of the relationship between patents and R&D in a panel of U.S.
firms, Hall et al. (1986) report there does seem to be a rather strong contemporaneous
relationship between R&D expenditures and patenting and estimates of the elasticity
is about 0.3, suggesting rather sharply diminishing returns.
Similarly, several researchers find out a similar pattern in empirical research.
For example, using time serious data, Griliches and Hauser (1993) find the increas-
ing ratio of R&D per patent. Caballero and Jaffe (1993) take the empirical parameter
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estimates and show that the observed decline in the productivity of research has im-
plications for the innovation rate. Cohen and Klepper (1996) find the number of
patents or innovations generated by per dollar of R&D declines with firm size. One
interpretation of these findings is that they reflect diminishing returns to R&D.
4.3.2 Stage II spillover
Assumption 2 The link between discoveries and total progress depends on spillover
which reflects the degree to which each firm can protect its ideas. So let -] R ^
- 5 -c 5 S] (R ^ - 5 -d 5 S ) be spillover rate from public firm to private
firm (resp. from private firm to public firm) , where -, R ^ - 5 S is minimum
unavoidable spillover. Then we have
c_ k cM-dkd ] d_ k dM -ckc
k, represent R&D discoveries generated via the R&D production function:
The link between discoveries and total progress depends on spillover which
reflects the degree to which each firm can protect its ideas. Each firm’s final technol-
ogy progress is the sum of its own discoveries and a fraction (equal to the spillover
parameter) of the other firms’ part.
Whether R&D findings are perfectly appropriable by the inventing firms or
not is an important issue concerned by researchers. While the generation of sci-
entific knowledge through R&D is costly, transferring this knowledge is effectively
zero. Once produced, the knowledge will not diminish or degrade as the result of us-
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age by different firms. Geroski (1995) for instance identifies three channels through
which R&D spillover can occur: (i) researchers exchange ideas during casual en-
counters, at seminars and through publications, (ii) researchers move between em-
ployers thereby taking their knowledge with them, and (iii) by observing the actions
of one researcher, another can deduct the line of reasoning that lies behind these ac-
tions.
R&D spillover has merged as one of the most active issues that might influence
the firms R&D investment decision and Result.
I can find both empirical and theoretical supports for my assumption. For ex-
ample, Mansfield et al. (1981) point out that about 60 percent of the patented innova-
tions are imitated within four years and the imitators’ costs are on average only 65%
of the innovator’s costs. I can also find variety of robust evidences of both national
and international technology spillover in an array of Keller’s papers (Keller 1998,
2000, 2002a, 2002b and 2004).
Introduced by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), leakages in technological
know-how can take place in final outcomes: each firm’s final cost reduction is the sum
of its autonomously acquired part and a fraction (equal to the spillover parameter) of
all other firms’ parts. This kind of spillover is defined as output spillover in Martin
(2002).
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4.3.3 Stage III product market
Rather than developing a formal model of product market competition, I will use a
reduced form approach in which I represent the object of the two firms’ profit and
social welfare as function of the outcome of previous studies of the game. This allows
greater general than study with say simple linear demand or function. It also allows
to better identify the conditions that drive the conclusion. In the appendix, I present
a simple explanation demonstrates that all the crucial assumptions I have made are
satisfied.
Assumption about firms’ profit
Let  ]  _ c] d be the total progress made by firm j in reducing its costs and/or
improving its product quality as a result of the R&D it has done in Stage 1 and any
knowledge spillover it has acquired from the other firm in Stage 2.
Let ;Jc]dK be the operating profit (revenue minus variable costs of produc-
tion) of firm j as a result of the progress made by each of the two firms. I make the
natural assumption that
(i) eash firm’s profit is an increasing function of the progress that it has made
and decreasing function of the progress made by its rival;
(ii) the impact on profit of a firm’s own progress dominates the impact of its
rival’s progress.
So formally we assume:
Assumption 3
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b;
b
` R ]
b;
b
^ R ]  ]  _ c] d ]  X_  \
So each firm’s profit is increasing in own R&D progress and decreasing in
rival’s progress.
Firms invest in new product efforts in an attempt to attain industry leadership,
thus securing high profits and benefiting from advantages relevant for the success of
future product generations. The ability to define and create new products and services
and quickly bring them to market is an increasingly important source of competitive
advantage. For most industrial and consumer product firms, successful new products
are engines of growth for sales and profitability (Cohen et al.,1997). Several frame-
works, including the product life cycle and the growth-share matrix, postulate the
need for new products that generate future profitability (Chaney et al., 1991; Cooper,
1988). Cooper (1988) argues that product is the core or central strategy in most in-
dustrial new product ventures; and it is through the product that the firm must seek
its differential advantage. Chaney et al. (1991) mention that the producer who as
a rule initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary;
they are, as it were, taught to want new things, or things which differ in some respect
or other from those which they have been in the habit of using.
R&D positively affects profitability because of factors such as product R&D
and process R&D having a positive impact on innovation and product quality (Hill
and Snell, 1989). Customers may be willing to buy more of the goods and pay a
premium price for these more innovative and better quality products. The resulting
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increase in sales and greater revenues per sale may more than offset the increased
expenditures on R&D to ultimately increase business profits. In addition, R&D has
a high fixed component, meaning R&D expenditures per unit of goods sold decrease
as total sales increase.
This effect is even more pronounced when R&D acts as an entry barrier. Car-
penter and Nakamoto (1989) argue that this learning process can produce a competi-
tive advantage apart from influencing the consumer’s ideal combination of attributes:
the pioneer can become strongly associated with the product category as a whole and,
as a result, become the "standard" against which all later entrants are judged. Being
strongly representative, the pioneer is competitively distinct, which makes it difficult
for later entrants to compete, especially for low-priced copies or so-called "me- too"
brands. Alpert and Kamins (1995) provide the first survey-based approach for ex-
amining consumer cognitions and they find consumers have positive attitude toward
pioneer brands in general, which is partially explained by their favorable perceptions
and positive purchase intentions of pioneer brands.
Furthermore, empirical study in new product development (Edgett et al., 1992)
provides some evidence that new product advantage leads to superior product per-
formance. The greater the new product advantage, the better the product market
performance will be. The ability to bring to market new products, which present the
characteristics necessary to be successful, may be critical. The commercial perfor-
mance of an innovative product is highly linked to a strong research and development
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(R&D) orientation and the use of sophisticated technologies in the development of
new product (Cooper, 1983).
Research in this area has focused mainly on the revenue and profit effects of
new products. Such as Bayus et al. (2003), based on data from firms in the personal
computer industry, find the effect of new product introductions on profit rate.
In terms of investor impact, it is known that new product announcement gener-
ates small excess stock market returns for a few days (Chaney et al., 1991). Excess
returns on the market value of firm’s stock can be created when the announcements
about R&D project made in the innovation and commercialization stages of the R&D
process (Kelm et al., 1995).
Another factor that characterizes the competitive position of a product is its cost
(Rust, 2002; Porter, 1980). One type of research output is the cost reducing, the lower
the cost, the greater the potential for profit will be, either by setting higher margins
or by penetrating the market with a lower price. The innovator of a process change
gains profit from the reduction in cost of his output which the process innovation
causes. Since a process innovation does not affect physical attributes of the product,
the innovator can gain additional profits by increasing his share of the market through
expansion and/or price-cutting. The main effect of the this type occurs where prices
or market shares are particularly stable for some reason such as well established
price leadership in the market. Finally, competition not only is a strong force to
differentiate products so that they satisfy demand better than the competitors’, but
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also draws management’s attention to cost efficiencies. Therefore, firms with a strong
competitive emphasis should design cost competitive innovations.
Assumptions about the consumer surplus and social welfare
The objective function of the public firm is social welfare which is consumer
surplus plus producer surplus, where the latter is the total operating profits of the two
firms.
Formally,
uJc] dK _ ;cJc] dKM ;dJc] dK M euJc] dK (1)
where uJc] dK denotes social welfare and euJc] dK is consumer surplus.
It is natural to assume that greater is the technological progress that each firm
makes in lowering its costs and/or improving the quality of its product, the greater is
the consumer surplus.
So formally I make the following assumption:
Assumption 4
beu
bc
` R ]
beu
bd
` R \
now it follows from (1) that
bu
b
_
b;
b
M
b;
b
M
beu
b
] ]  _ c] d]  X_ \
Given my previous assumptions I derive that
b;
b
` R]
beu
b
` R but
b;
b
^ R] ]  _ c] d]  X_ \
140
In many cases the magnitude of the effect on a firm’s profit of an increase in
the technological progress made by its rival is quite small, so in a very wide range of
circumstances it will be the case that
bu
b
`
b;
b
` R ]  _ c] d\
Moreover, given assumption 3 (ii) and assumption 4, I can certainly get that it
will always be the case that
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
` R \ (2)
For the main result of this chapter, I will make the following assumption:
Assumption 5
(i)
bu
bd
`
b;d
bd
` R ]
(ii)
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
`
b;c
bc
M
b;d
bd
` R
though strictly speaking assumption 5(ii) is stronger than I need.
In the appendix to this chapter, I prove that in the standard toy model that it
is widely used-homogeneous product and linear demand- assumption 3, 4 and 5 are
certainly satisfied.
Before proceeding notice that it follows from assumption 3(i) and assumption
5(ii) that
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
`
b;d
bd
`
b;d
bd
M-
b;d
bc
(3)
Consumers will benefit from price cutting or quality improvement of products
due to technological improvement.
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Several studies point that firms are prompted to intensify research and devel-
opment on needs-specific products market competence as customers become more
demanding. Wheelwright and Clark (1992) observe that customers have grown more
sophisticated and are more sensitive to nuances and differences in a product and are
attracted to products that provide solutions to their particular problems and needs.
Porter (1990) points that greater customer demandingness may indicate that cus-
tomers are not satisfied with existing products, which should push firms to increase
their R&D investment and develop new products to replace those in the market.
In general, marketing theory predicts that customer-oriented firms serve the
needs of the consumers better, especially by providing products that fit their needs
best (Griffin and Hauser, 1993; Day, 2003). Day (2003) finds that in most markets,
there are one or two companies that outperform their rivals by staying more closely
connected to their customers. New product attributes such as new product quality,
reliability, and uniqueness, provide a more concrete picture of a firm’s ability to meet
customer needs.
Calantone and Cooper (1981) points out an innovative product to the market,
offered unique features to the customer, and met customer needs better than com-
peting products. Griffin and Hauser (1993) observe that in recent years, many U.S.
and Japanese firms have adopted Quality Function Deployment (QFD). QFD is a
total-quality-management process in which the "voice of the customer" is deployed
throughout the R&D, engineering, and manufacturing stages of product development.
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Cooper (1983) concludes the single most important dimension leading to new
product success is product uniqueness and superiority. Unique, superior products
are typically highly innovative and new to the market incorporate unique features for
the customer; meet customers’ needs better than competing products; allow the cus-
tomers to reduce costs or to do something previously impossible; and are of higher
quality (tighter specifications, stronger, lasted longer, more reliable, etc.) than com-
peting products. That product uniqueness and superiority is such important ingredi-
ent in new product success and is so obvious and truistic that it tends to be overlooked.
Welfare conclusion is difficult to draw. An profit increase in the R&D winner
firm will lead to the profit decrease in another firm. But it is reasonable to assume
that former is higher than the latter. Plus there is increase in consumer surplus, so
social welfare will increase with any firm’s technology improvement.
4.4 Equilibrium
To solve the equilibrium of the model, I assume firms produce homogenous product
and compete in quantities and choose quantities simultaneously. Firms’ strategies
consist of a level of research and a subsequent production strategy based on their
R&D choice. Both public and private firms behave noncoopratively in choosing R&D
levels. For public firm, the aim is social welfare maximum. While for private firm, it
is profit maximum. I am going to solve the 3-stage game backwards; the equilibrium
of product market has been summarized in assumptions 3 to 5 in the previous section.
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In this section, I will solve the equilibrium spillover rate and R&D efficiency in
second stage and R&D intensity in the first stage.
4.4.1 R&D spillover
I have already assumed that there are two firms compete in the product market. One is
public firm and another is private firm. Private firm is assumed to be profit-maximizer
while public firm is assumed to maximize social welfare.
Consider following game in which the public firm takes c] d ] -d as given
and chooses -c to
o
-c
u }JcK M -dJdK] JdK M -cJcK ! c ! d
While private firm takes d] c] -c as given and chooses -d to
o
-d
;d }JdK M -cJcK] JcK M -dJdK ! d
Proposition 1 There is full spillover from public firm to private firm, while
only miminum spillover from private firm to public firm. Because of spillover effect,
c 5 d ] public firm always achieves less progress than private firm, which indicates
that private firm is more efficient in R&D than public firm.
-c _ S] -d _ -
Proof From assumption 5, we can get
bu
bd
` R ] d_JdK M -cJcK] and
JcK ` R] so S will increase with -c] and because R ^ -c 5 S] so the optimal -c
equals 1.
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From assumption 3, we get
b;d
bc
^ R ] c_JcK M -dJdK] and JdK ` R]
so there is negative realtionship between ;d and -d ] and also R ^ - 5 -d 5 S,
private firm will choose mimimum spillover rate witch equals -\
Substitute -c _ S] -d _ - into c_JcK M -dJdK and d_JdK M
-cJcK] we can get c_JcK M -JdK and d_JdK M JcK\ Because - 5 S]
c 5 d is proved
While in the mainstream models firms are perfectly symmetric, they receive as
much R&D spillover as they generate themselves. In reality, however, there might be
various settings in which firms will generate more than they receive or vice versa. In
my model, the degree of spillovers is an endogenous variable, means that competing
firms are able to choose on their own to disclose scientific information.
Spillover of research knowledge is unavoidable. Most technologies have some
public good aspects. Moreover, rival firms are able to, through industrial espionage
and reverse engineering, access and copy new innovations, are thus able to eat into
monopoly profits of innovators. There is free flow of innovative information from an
innovator to its competitors (the technological spillover), thereby increasing the lat-
ter’s R&D efficiency. In deciding how much to invest in R&D individual firms always
take into account the competitive-advantage externality. Technological spillover quite
often occurs during the R&D process. R&D typically caries a positive externality; if
one firm conducts R&D another firm can absorb part of this effort without having to
pay for it.
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Not all knowledge falls into this category; some knowledge may be private and
easily appropriated by the firm. So it will be reasonable for public firm and private
firm to choose their R&D spillover rate according to their own operation strategies.
R&D spillover provides benefit to the public as a whole, but not to the innovator.
As a result, private firm’s R&D incentives will be discouraged by the R&D spillover.
The threat of spillover affects R&D investments and consequently reduces innovative
activity. The presence of R&D spillover thus creates a wedge between private and
social returns to R&D. Industries with excessive spillover are likely to have little
private R&D investment and might have to rely on public R&D funding.
Overall, because of the risk of the R&D activity being taken might be greater
than the firm can accept, although if successful there would be very large benefits
to society as a whole. Society would like the investment to be made, but from the
perspective of the firm it is not a reasonable investment. From the state view, they
encourage the SOEs to share their successful experiences with other firms in order to
improve the productive efficiency of the whole economy. For example, in 1996, the
Chinese government observed the successful performance of Handan Steel Company
and made it as a well-managed and cost-cutting model for others to emulate.
4.4.2 R&D activities
Proposition 2 c ` d , that R&D intensity of public firm is higher than it of
private firm.
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Proof I subsitute the optimal spillover rate into the optimization functions
-c _ S] -d _ -
public firm takes d as given and chooses c to
o
c]
u
#
JcK M -JdK] JdK M JcK
$
! c ! d
While private firm takes c as given and chooses d to
o
d
;d
#
JdK M JcK] JcK M -JdK
$
! d
optimization function can be reorganized as
Public firm:
 RJcK
5
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
6
_ S]
Private firm:
 RJdK
5
b;d
bd
M -
b;d
bc
6
_ S]
From assumption 1, we have known that  RJK ` R]  RRJK ^ R\ if c ` d]
because  RRJK ^ R ,  RJcK ^  RJdK] so
bu
bc
M
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bd
M -
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Similar analysis for c 5 d ]
so it is clear that:
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(4.1)
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from assumption 3 and 4, we know, that
b;d
bc
^ R]  !-
b;d
bc
` R\and
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bc
` R\So
5
bu
bc
! -
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` R\
From assumption 5, we know that
5
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bd
!
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` R\
so,
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bc
N c ` d , that R&D intensity of public
firm is higher than private firm.
4.5 Results explain
4.5.1 R&D intensity
From the last sector, I have proved that public firm has higher R&D intensity com-
pared with private counterparty which coincides with the empirical result which I get
from the previous chapter by analyzing the R&D data of Chinese large and medium
size industrial enterprises. To explore this issue I have used a mixed duopoly model
that is a model in which there is one private-sector profit-maximising firm and one
state-owned enterprise pursuing a non-profit objective of social welfare. Mixed mar-
ket theory has been widely applied to the research of innovation in recent years. The
mixed market theory is largely consistent with the current ownership structure in the
Chinese manufacturing sector.
Normally, firms establish their R&D investment budget plans by estimating
revenue and then multiplying it by an industry-specific percentage factor. Then they
would adjust their R&D expenses in response to external events and economic condi-
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tions (Frumau, 1992). So over a longer term, competing firms within same industry
evolve to have different levels of R&D intensity and R&D strategies.
Public firm and private firm different R&D investment is decided by their op-
eration strategies and the external economy and policy environment give these strate-
gies practical support. In transition economies like China, public firms have to afford
massive social welfare duties, when they make R&D investment decision they have
to count in all the social benefits and costs instead of focusing on their own profit
targets like private firms.
I also focus on the situation where there is imperfect appropriability of knowl-
edge. This is captured through the existence of R&D spillovers. Most technologies
have some public good aspects. Whether R&D findings are perfectly appropriable
by the inventing firm or not is an important issue concerned by researchers. R&D
spillover has emerged as one of the most active issue that might influence the firms
R&D investment decision.
However the existing literature focuses on how the level of R&D spending
differs across the two different types of firm, and typically assumes that the level of
spillover is the same for both types of firm. That is, in the mainstream models firms
are perfectly symmetric, they receive as much spillovers as they generate themselves.
In reality, however, there might be various settings in which firms will generate more
than they receive or vice versa. The contribution I have made is to endogenise the
extent of protection of intellectual property that the two types of firms would seek.
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That is I endogenise the level of spillover – subject to there being an irreducible
minimum level of spillover that any firm can obtain.
The key result is that while a welfare-maximising state-owned enterprise will
recognize and value the positive externality flowing from its R&D and so choose a
minimum level of intellectual protection – maximum spillover. Because of its social
welfare maximum aim, the public firm will see a higher benefit for the society as
whole of its R&D than the private firm whose aim is just its own profit and so do
more of it.
Market forces provide private firms with some incentives to engage in R&D
activities. However, they may have fewer incentives to conduct R&D than the so-
ciety want. In deed, R&D spillover is a potential source of market failure which
leads to the insufficient private R&D incentives. They can not demand payment
from other producers who benefit from their R&D through spillovers. Private firm–
a profit-maximising firm will choose the maximum protection (minimum spillover).
Moreover, the private innovator recognizes that it can benefit from R&D efforts from
its public competitors, there is a free-rider aspect to R&D, and the private firm might
well leave R&D to its rivals to carry out.
Hence, the total amount of R&D investment made by the public firm is higher
than the total amount of investment made by the private firm.
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4.5.2 R&D efficiency
By endogenising the level of spillover I have been able to explain another key find-
ing of the empirical research reported in my previous chapter: the total amount of
progress made by the public firm relative to its R&D is lower than the total amount
of progress made by the private firm in relation to its R&D, due to private firm enjoy
the full spill over from R&D progress made by the public firm, while public firm can
only share part of the progress made by the private firm.
State owned firms, who possess more innovation resources and government
support are not the ones performing better technically. Because Chinese state owned
enterprises still have to bear many policy-determined burdens which cause the com-
petition between SOEs and their conterparts in the non-state sectors to be unfair.
Worse yet, there are incentive problems: the presence of multiple tasks often dulls the
intensity of incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). This in turn creates several
problems. First, many of these goals are not easily measured and there is no obvi-
ous way of balancing them one against the other. This creates monitoring difficulties
(Clarke, 2003). Second, when politicians have direct control over the operation of
SOEs, there is likely to be more labor redundancy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In
fact, there is strong evidence that excess employment in Chinese SOEs is large (Dong
and Putterman, 2003). Bai et al. (2000) also predict that private enterprises do not
have any incentives to employ surplus labor to help maintain social stability. Third,
when firms are not profit maximizers for whatever reason, higher productivity may
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actually lead to greater allocative distortion, lower profits, and lower economic effi-
ciency (Bai et al., 1997).
Several features that distinguish non-state enterprises from SOEs are important
in explaining why non-state businesses may outperform SOEs. First, non-state enter-
prises have strong profit incentives and sharply focus on their financial bottom lines,
whereas SOEs often have a variety of nonfinancial objectives, including the provision
of social services (Byrd and Gelb, 1990; Hu and Khan, 1997). Second, unlike their
counterparts in the state sector, non-state enterprises face hard budget constraints,
with high bankruptcy rates, while loss-making SOEs can obtain budgetary and credit
subsidies (Qian and Xu, 1993). Third, non-state enterprises enjoy more operational
autonomy and, in particular, are relatively free of interference from the central and
local bureaucracy in their labor hiring and firing and wage-setting practices, allowing
for far greater labor market flexibility (Hu and Khan, 1997).
With state subsidies, protection, and easy to access to bank debts, SOEs face
smaller bankruptcy pressure than other ownership firms, which has strong effects on
managerial incentives to improve firm performance. SOEs might take high risk R&D
investment which is greater than the firms’s affordability. Heavily relying on the state
for survival and development will also become a heavy burden to public finance and
endanger the bank system (Zhang, 2004; Aziz, 2008). Lack of operation monitor and
soft budget constraint, the efficiency performance of R&D investment in state owned
sector is not very optimistic. Indeed, SOEs often use their social responsibilities as
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an excuse for not restructuring and for asking for more subsidies (the soft budget
constraint problem); on the other hand, the government also uses these as reasons to
intervene with the operation of an enterprise.
4.6 Conclusion
The aim of this Chapter has been to provide a theoretical framework within which
to try to explain the key empirical finding of the previous Chapter: that state-owned
enterprises spend more on R&D than private sector enterprises but are less efficient,
that is they make less innovative progress relative to the amount of R&D.
To explore this issue I have used a mixed duopoly model that is a model in
which there is one private-sector profit-maximising firm and one state-owned enter-
prise pursuing a non-profit objective of social welfare. Both firms undertake R&D
which, in this model, is process (cost-reducing) R&D. There is an extensive litera-
ture of such models, and, as is common in that literature, I also focus on the situation
where there is imperfect appropriability of knowledge. This is captured through the
existence of R&D spillovers.
Mixed market theory, characterized by the presence of both profit maximizing
private firms and welfare maximizing public sector firms has been widely applied
to the research of innovation in recent years. The mixed market theory is largely
consistent with the current ownership structure in the Chinese manufacturing sector.
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Most technologies have some public good aspects. Whether R&D findings are
perfectly appropriable by the inventing firm or not is an important issue concerned
by researchers. R&D spillover has emerged as one of the most active issue that might
influence the firms R&D investment decision. However the existing literature focuses
on how the level of R&D spending differs across the two different types of firm, and
typically assumes that the level of spillover is the same for both types of firm. That
is, in the mainstream models firms are perfectly symmetric, they receive as much
spillovers as they generate themselves. In reality, however, there might be various
settings in which firms will generate more than they receive or vice versa.
Since I am interested in explaining how both the level of R&D spending and
the efficiency of that spending varies across the two types of firm, the contribution I
have made is to endogenise the extent of protection of intellectual property that the
two types of firms would seek. That is I endogenise the level of spillover – subject to
there being an irreducible minimum level of spillover that any firm can obtain.
The key result is that while a welfare-maximising state-owned enterprise will
recognize and value the positive externality flowing from its R&D and so choose a
minimum level of intellectual protection – maximum spillover – a profit-maximising
firm will choose the maximum protection (minimum spillover).
This has two further implications:
(1) Because of its higher spillover the public firm will see a higher return to its
R&D than the private firm and so do more of it;
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(2) Because the private firm benefits from both the higher R&D spend and the
higher spillover of the public firm while the public firm gets a minimum spillover
from the lower level of R&D by the private firm, the total amount of progress made
by the public firm relative to its R&D is lower than the total amount of progress made
by the private firm in relation to its R&D.
Thus by endogenising the level of spillover I have been able to explain the two
key findings of the empirical research reported in my previous chapter.
However, great care has to be exercised in drawing policy conclusions from
this. Precisely because of the public good nature of knowledge and the market fail-
ures than can potentially arise through the imperfect appropriability of knowledge,
the fact that state-owned enterprises are less privately efficient in their research than
private sector firms does not mean that they are less socially efficient and should be
discouraged from doing research. From a social point of view the state-owned enter-
prise is more efficient than the private sector firm, and the fact that it also does more
R&D is potentially a beneficial outcome.
Since the aim of this chapter has been primarily positive – that of explaining the
empirical findings of my previous chapter, I have not developed the welfare aspects
of the model, which remains an important unexplored research agenda. In particular,
I have simply assumed that there is a mixed duopoly. A more interesting question
is, in the context of a model where the level of spillovers is endogenous, what is the
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optimal number of both public sector and private sector firms? Is it optimal to have
any private sector firms and, if so, how many?
Another limitation of the model presented here is that, in common with the
literature, it assumes that knowledge spillovers are additive.
Another important extension is to examine how the results would go through
if, as in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) a richer menu of information –sharing tech-
nologies were allowed – so knowledge produced by different firms could be perfect
substitutes or perfect complements for one another.
4.7 Appendix
The aim of this appendix is to demonstrate that in the standard toy model that econo-
mists often use in this literature- constant marginal costs, homogeneous product, lin-
ear demand - Assumptions 3, 4 and 5 of the main text are valid.
Consider the following model.
Two firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous product. The inverse demand for
this product is given by
r JsK _  ! s]
where  6 R is price; s _ c M d is aggregate output and  6 R,  _ c] d
is the output of firm .
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The cost of production of firm  is
eJK _ J ! K M 
T

where ,R 5  ^  is the total amount of cost reduction achieved by firm 
through a combination of own R&D and spillovers from the rival firm, and , R ^
 ^  is the common cost base from which firms are starting.
Given this set-up, the operating profit (revenue minus variable costs) of firm 
are:
;Jc] dK _ } ! Jc M dK ! eJK _ } ! Jc M dK ! J ! K ! 
consumer surplus is
euJc] dK _
S
T
Jc M dK
T
and social welfare is
uJc] dK _ ;cJc] dK M ;dJc] dK M euJc] dK
I assume that firm A is a public-sector firm whose objective is social welfare
while firm B is a private-sector firm whose objective is its own operating profit. I
seek a Nash equilibrium in which each firm chooses its own output to maximise its
objective taking as given the output of the other.
First-order conditions are:
bu
bc
_
b;c
bc
M
b;d
bc
M
beu
bc
_ }!Tc !d !J!cK!TcM}!dM}c Md _ R
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i.e.
J ! K M c ! Uc ! d _ R (1)
and
b;d
bd
_  ! Td ! c ! J ! dK ! Td _ R
i.e.
J ! K M d ! Vd ! c _ R (2)
Solving these gives
c _
UJ ! K M Vc ! d
SS
] d _
TJ ! K ! c M Ud
SS
(3)
To have a well-defined solution these must be positive, which requires:
d ^ Vc M UJ ! K and c ^ Ud M TJ ! K (4)
Notice that:
(i) Each firm’s output is an increasing function of its own progress and a
decreasing function of its rival’s progress.
(ii) Each firm’s output responds more strongly to its own progress than to
its rival’s progress.
(iii) In the situation where both firms have made the same amount of
progress, i.e. c _ d , then c _ U_T d reflecting the fact that firm A expands
output to the point where price equals marginal cost while firm B will operate where
marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
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Now substitute the equilibrium output levels back into the expressions for op-
erating profit and social welfare, and express operating profit, consumer surplus and
social welfare as functions of the underlying progress made by the two firms. Notice
that from the f.o.c. (1) it follows that
;cJc] dK _ 
T
c _
5
UJ ! K M Vc ! d
SS
6T
(5)
while from the f.o.c. (2)
;dJc] dK _ T
T
d _ T
5
TJ ! K M Ud ! c
SS
6T
(6)
In addition we have:
euJc] dK _
S
T
Jc M dK
T _
S
T
5
WJ ! K M Uc M Td
SS
6T
(7)
So now let us consider in turn each of the three assumptions.
Assumption 3
From (6) and (7) we have:
b;c
bc
_
Z
SS
c ` R]
b;c
bd
_ !
T
SS
c ^ R]
b;d
bd
_
ST
SS
d ` R]
b;d
bc
_ !
V
SS
d ^ R
(8)
This confirms that operating profit is increasing in own progress and decreasing
in rival’s progress. So Assumption 3(i) is satisfied.
Moreover, it follows from (8) that:
b;c
bc
M
b;c
bd
_
X
SS
c ` R]
b;d
bd
M
b;d
bc
_
Z
SS
d ` R]
So Assumption 3(ii) is satisfied.
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Assumption 4
From (7) we have
beu
bc
_
U
SS
Jc M dK ` R]
beu
bd
_
T
SS
Jc M dK ` R
and so Assumption 4 is satisfied.
Assumption 5
From (5), (6) and (7) we have:
bu
bc
_
b;c
bc
!
V
SS
d M
U
SS
Jc M dK _
b;c
bc
M
U
SS
c !
S
SS
d (9)
bu
bd
_
b;c
bd
!
T
SS
c M
T
SS
Jc M dK _
b;d
bd
M
T
SS
d (10)
From (10) it follows that Assumption 5(i) is satisfied.
Adding (9) and (10) together, we see that
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
_
b;c
bc
M
b;d
bd
M
U
SS
c M
S
SS
d ] (11)
and so Assumption 5(ii) is certainly satisfied.
Incidentally, from (10) we see that
bu
bd
`
b;d
bd
` R] (12)
While from (9) we see that
bu
bc
`
b;c
bc
iff Uc ` d (13)
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So the restrictions required by Assumption 4 on the sign and magnitude of
bu
bc
may not always hold, though they will do so in a wide class of cases.
On the other hand, the restrictions in Assumption 4 are stronger than we actu-
ally need to prove that c ` d . For if we can show that
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
`
b;d
bd
(14)
then it follows a fortiori that
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
`
b;d
bd
M -
b;d
bc
(15)
But from (10) and (11) we have
bu
bc
M
bu
bd
_
b;d
bd
M c M
S
SS
d (16)
and so (14) and hence (15) is certainly true in this particular model .
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Over the past 30 years, the Chinese market economy reform has helped drive
home the importance of market survival and competitiveness, and force firms to pay
attention to improve efficiency and productivity and not to deviate too much from
profit maximization.
Enterprise reform in China encompasses a large scale institutional transforma-
tion including reforms and the games played by government, management, and in-
vestors become more and more complex than those addressed in traditional corporate
finance theory. Different ownership sectors firms’ different financial and technical
behavior and performance has been observed.
Advantages and disadvantages of state sector come clearly from the nature of
the Chinese institutional environment, and there is little that can be concluded apart
from that environment. While firms in state sector were highly dependent on the
state for cheap credit, the state also depended on these firms to provide employees
with jobs and other social and political functions, such as social justice, employment,
stabilization of markets, protection of national industries, and enhancement of state
security. SOEs ( state owned enterprises) appear to behave significantly different
from other local-owned firms due to the multiplicity of the goals.
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Since the 1980s, the expansion of joint ventures, the maturation of collective
industry, the gradual emergence of Chinese private industry all point to further inten-
sification of competition in the markets. SOEs faced increasingly fierce competition
from the private, foreign sectors as well as among themselves. In general, the increas-
ing importance of non-state sectors have been an important contributor to growth, and
the rapid growth of China’s non-state sectors has been critical to the success of that
country’s transition to a market economy. The success of China’s non-state sectors
has sparked growing interest in measuring and explaining their conduct and perfor-
mance.
Given the environment of relatively high uncertainty, changing sources of un-
certainty, market failure, poor formal investor protection, low survivorship during
early stages of firms’ development, private firms need to gain comparative advantage
by providing effective governance, as the founders of many successful private sector
firms usually have a very high ownership stake.
The above discussion indicates that ownerships structure may influence the
productivity and survival of firms via a number of channels. These findings under-
score the need to distinguish various ownership and control rights, and to examine
both their static and dynamic effects. Because conditions in China were similar in
many ways to other transition economies, these results provide important information
about the process of economic transformation more generally.
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As the world’s second-largest economy, China deserves careful investigation.
Its unique combination of blazing growth and unorthodox policy demands close at-
tention. And its penchant for creating new combinations of material resources and
institutional arrangements ensures that research on China’s economy will continue to
produce abundant intellectual rewards.
This thesis focuses on understanding firms’ behavior in the transition economy
from both the empirical and theoretical points of view. Rooted in the existing liter-
ature, the thesis aims at exploring the following research questions: Did the macro-
economy conditions and instability impact the survival of firms? Is it possible to
investigate the ownerships structure influence through examining innovation and ef-
ficiency activities of firms? For what reason, do firms from different sectors have
different R&D performance?
In this brief conclusion I wish to summarise the results in Section 5.1, original
contributions in section 5.2 and to propose future research directions in Section 5.3.
5.1 Summary of the research project
I review the literature on firm survival and R&D competition related issues in the first
chapter. In the review, I mainly focus on economy background, competition and state
protection, innovation and efficiency.
In chapter 2, I examined the relationship between financial distress on the one
hand, and firm-level characteristics and the macroeconomic cycle on the other, fo-
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cusing on listed Chinese companies. The period of analysis, 1995-2006, has seen
massive regulatory and institutional changes in China, and evidenced substantial vari-
ation in the business cycle and instability. State protection in China ensures that there
are only very few business exits. Therefore, I conduct my analysis based on a syn-
thetic measure of financial distress. Conditioned on the above institutional setting,
I develop a simple economic model of financial distress. Using hazard regression
analysis, I find important effects of firm-level characteristics such as age of the firm,
size, gearing and cash flow. In addition, I find an important effect of instability in the
interest rate, as well as important institutional effects. The results are robust to un-
observed heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar
macroeconomic founding conditions.
Chapter 3 has investigated the determinants of both the level of R&D spend-
ing and the efficiency of this spending - the amount of innovative progress made
in relation to the level of R&D spending - for a sample of large and medium size
Chinese industrial enterprises from 2000-2007. Using R&D investment regression
model and production frontier function, I found that the presence of state ownership
is positively related with R&D investment, but negatively related to R&D perfor-
mance. Foreign firms are technical leader in Chinese industries and have advan-
tage in R&D efficiency. These points out the fact that while the firms possessing
more innovation resources and government support - the state-owned enterprises -
undertake more R&D, they are not the ones performing better technically. Empiri-
165
cal results also show significant cross industries differences in R&D investment and
output. One important caveat to the work reported in this Chapter is that since China
is still transitioning from its central planning legacy, the behavior of firms - partic-
ularly state-owned enterprises - may be driven by beliefs and expectations (culture)
that are still in a process of change through the process of transition, and so the ob-
served behavioural differences across different ownership structures may be different
from those that would be observed in a longer-run steady-state outcome.
Chapter 4 has been to provide a theoretical framework within which to try to
explain the key empirical finding of the previous Chapter. To explore this issue I
have used a mixed duopoly model that is a model in which there is one private-sector
profit-maximising firm and one state-owned enterprise pursuing a non-profit objec-
tive of social welfare. Both firms undertake R&D which, in this model, is process
(cost-reducing) R&D. By endogenising the level of spillover I have been able to ex-
plain the two key findings of the empirical research reported in my previous chapter:
(1) because of its higher spillover the public firm will see a higher return to its R&D
than the private firm and so do more of it; (2) because the private firm benefits from
both the higher R&D spend and the higher spillover of the public firm while the pub-
lic firm gets a minimum spillover from the lower level of R&D by the private firm,
the total amount of progress made by the public firm relative to its R&D is lower than
the total amount of progress made by the private firm in relation to its R&D.
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However, great care has to be exercised in drawing policy conclusions from
this research. Precisely because of the public good nature of knowledge and the mar-
ket failures can potentially arise through the imperfect appropriability of knowledge,
the fact that state-owned enterprises are less privately efficient in their research than
private sector firms does not mean that they are less socially efficient and should be
discouraged from doing research. From a social point of view the state-owned enter-
prise is more efficient than the private sector firm, and the fact that it also does more
R&D is potentially a beneficial outcome.
5.2 Original contributions
My research has enriched both the empirical and theoretical literatures of transi-
tion economy, offer interesting points of comparison with related studies in western
economies, and highlight several policy implications.
(1) Several important contributions have been made to research issue about fi-
nancial distress of Chinese enterprises. First, I develop a model of state protection in
an economy with high sunk costs and limited secondary market for acquired capital.
Testable implications are verified using duration data on financial distress. Second,
given the importance of the Chinese economy, understanding failure in Chinese in-
dustry is important for investors. Third, while the macro economy is a potentially
important determinant of financial distress, the effect of macroeconomic conditions
and instability on financial distress and exit has not been adequately studied in an
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emerging market context. Thus, my research is useful for credit risk measurement
and management for China, and for emerging economies more generally. Fourth, my
research quantities the effect of institutional factors, which are expected to be impor-
tant against the backdrop of massive economic transition experienced in China.
(2) This thesis contributes to the empirical research of R&D efficiency of firms
under various forms of ownership in transition economy. While there have been a
number of theoretical works show that R&D activities in centralized economies are
less efficient than those in decentralized market economy, and some empirical studies
examine the determinants of inter-firm differences (including ownership and institu-
tional factors) in productive efficiency in developed economy, empirical analysis of
ownership impact on firm R&D performance in transition economy is relatively rare
(Zhang et al. 2003; Qian and Xu, 1998; Huang and Xu 1998; Goel, 1999; Frydman
et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2001).
(3) Since I am interested in explaining how both the level of R&D spending and
the efficiency of that spending varies across the two types of firm, the contribution I
have made is to endogenise the extent of protection of intellectual property that the
two types of firms would seek. In the mainstream mixed duopoly models of R&D
competition, firms are assumed to be perfectly symmetric, and they receive as much
spillovers as they generate themselves. In reality, however, there might be various
settings in which firms will generate more than they receive or vice versa.
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5.3 Suggestions for further research
(1) For the research issue of financial distress of Chinese enterprises, there are several
lines of further research emerge from my work. First, the links between the process
of macroeconomic, industrial and legislative reforms in China and corporate distress
hypothesized in this thesis need to be further examined. Second, the finding of a
decreasing baseline hazard rate is unusual in the literature. Robustness of this finding
needs to be studied and explanations sought in the specifics of industrial dynamics in
China. Third, implications of this work for credit scoring, and more generally credit
management under the Basel II framework, require further examination. Finally,
while I identify new evidence on the determinants of financial distress in Chinese
industry, similar work for other emerging market economies is required for obtaining
a more precise understanding of these issues.
(2) For the research issue of R&D efficiency, I have not developed the welfare
aspects of the R&D competition model, which remains an important unexplored re-
search agenda. In particular, I have simply assumed that there is a mixed duopoly. A
more interesting question is, in the context of a model where the level of spillovers
is endogenous, what is the optimal number of both public sector and private sector
firms? Is it optimal to have any private sector firms and, if so, how many?
Another important extension is to examine how the results would go through
if, as in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) a richer menu of information - sharing tech-
169
nologies were allowed - so knowledge produced by different firms could be perfect
substitutes or perfect complements for one another.
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